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year.1 Despite that ubiquity, the law is unsettled on a very basic 
question: whether the Guidelines trigger defendants’ rights under the 
Due Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment to the United States 
Constitution. Specifically, the federal courts of appeals are split 
regarding whether use of a vague Guideline at sentencing deprives the 
defendant of liberty without due process of law.2 
The importance of this split has come into sharp relief following 
Johnson v. United States,3 in which the United States Supreme Court 
struck down as unconstitutionally vague a portion of the penalty 
provisions of the Armed Career Criminal Act (ACCA) known as the 
“residual clause.”4 That clause imposed a fifteen-year mandatory 
minimum prison term for defendants with at least three prior 
convictions for “a violent felony or a serious drug offense.”5 Included 
in the statutory definition of “violent felony” was any crime 
“involv[ing] conduct that presents a serious potential risk of physical 
injury to another.”6 The Court held that the use of this latter statutory 
phrase to increase a defendant’s sentence violated the Due Process 
Clause of the United States Constitution because “the wide-ranging 
inquiry” it requires “both denies fair notice to defendants and invites 
arbitrary enforcement by judges.”7 
The Guidelines also contain a residual clause. It is textually identical 
to the statutory phrase struck down in Johnson.8 Just as the ACCA 
residual clause increased the applicable mandatory minimum, the 
Guidelines’ residual clause dramatically increases the sentencing range 
 
1 See U.S. SENTENCING COMM’N, ANNUAL REPORT A-4 (2014), http://www.ussc.gov 
/research-and-publications/annual-reports-sourcebooks/2014/annual-report-2014 
[hereinafter 2014 COMM’N REPORT]. 
2 On the last day of the October 2015 term, the Court granted certiorari in a case raising 
this question. See Beckles v. United States, 136 S. Ct. 2510, 2510 (2016). 
3 135 S. Ct. 2551, 2555 (2015). 
4 Id. at 2557. The provision got its name because it is the last, catch-all part of the statute’s 
definition of “violent felony.” Id. at 2556. 
5 18 U.S.C. § 924(e)(1) (2012). 
6 18 U.S.C. § 924(e)(2)(B)(ii). 
7 Johnson, 135 S. Ct. at 2557. 
8 U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL § 4B1.2(a)(2) (U.S. SENTENCING COMM’N, 
2015). 
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for a federal defendant9—often by a decade or more.10 Because of these 
similarities, Johnson casts serious doubt on the validity of the sentences 
of defendants whose Guidelines ranges were calculated with a residual-
clause enhancement. The Third, Sixth, Seventh, Tenth, and D.C. 
Circuit Courts of Appeals have held that Johnson’s constitutional 
reasoning “applies with equal force to the Guidelines’ residual 
clause.”11 
There is, however, a difference between the ACCA and the 
Guidelines: while the ACCA imposed a mandatory sentencing 
enhancement, the Guidelines are advisory. Although a federal judge is 
required to calculate the Guidelines range in every criminal case, the 
judge need not adhere to that range when selecting a sentence. After 
Johnson, the Eleventh Circuit Court of Appeals concluded this 
difference was dispositive, holding the Guidelines’ advisory nature 
rendered them immune from due process challenges on vagueness 
grounds.12 
Does Johnson doom the Guidelines’ residual clause? The answer to 
this question is critical to hundreds of defendants whose Guidelines 
ranges were increased by the residual clause.13 But looming behind this 
 
9 The sentencing-range increase under the Guidelines operates very similarly to the 
ACCA’s mandatory-minimum increase described in the text accompanying notes 5 and 6, 
supra. The increased Guidelines range is tied to whether the defendant is designated a 
“career offender.” Id. § 4B1.1(b). That designation applies if (1) the instant offense of 
conviction and (2) at least two prior felony convictions are for “a crime of violence or a 
controlled substance offense.” Id. § 4B1.1(a)(1). Just as the ACCA’s residual clause was 
part of the definition of “violent felony” under the statute, the Guidelines’ residual clause is 
part of the definition of “crime of violence.” Id. § 4B1.2(a)(2). 
10 PAUL J. HOFER, SENTENCING RES. COUNSEL PROJECT, DATA ANALYSES 1 (2016), 
http://www.src-project.org/wp-content/uplaods/2016/04/Data-Analyses-1.pdf. In FY 2014, 
the average guideline minimum was 204 months for career offenders, compared to 83 
months for non-career offenders. Id. The average sentence actually imposed was 138.6 
months for career offenders, compared to 62 months for non-career offenders. Id. 
11 United States v. Pawlak, 822 F.3d 902, 907 (6th Cir. 2016); accord United States v. 
Hurlburt, 835 F.3d 715, 725 (7th Cir. 2016) (en banc); United States v. Sheffield, 832 F.3d 
296, 312 (D.C. Cir. 2016); United States v. Calabretta, 831 F.3d 128, 135 (3d Cir. 2016); 
United States v. Madrid, 805 F.3d 1204, 1210–11 (10th Cir. 2015). 
12 The Eleventh Circuit is the only court to have reached this conclusion in a published 
decision. United States v. Matchett, 802 F.3d 1185, 1196 (11th Cir. 2015). However, as 
explained later and in an accompanying text, other federal appellate courts have long barred 
vagueness challenges to the sentencing guidelines. The Eleventh Circuit relied on the 
reasoning of those cases in deciding Matchett. See infra, notes 87–90. 
13 The size of this group is unknown but undoubtedly quite large. See Douglas A. 
Berman, How Many Federal Prisoners Have “Strong Johnson Claims” (and How Many 
Lawyers Will Help Figure This Out?), SENT’G L. & POL’Y BLOG (June 26, 2015), 
http://sentencing.typepad.com/sentencing_law_and_policy/2015/06/how-many-federal        
-prisoners-have-strong-johnson-claims-and-how-many-lawyers-will-help-figure-this-out 
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question is an even larger one: do defendants have a due process right 
to Guidelines provisions that can be interpreted with reasonable 
precision? This Article takes a historical, jurisprudential, and pragmatic 
approach to that question, examining the roots of the Guidelines, the 
changes wrought by the shift from mandatory to advisory Guidelines, 
and the continuing effect of the Guidelines on federal sentencing 
practice. From that examination, several truths emerge. First, the 
Guidelines are used to calculate sentencing ranges for tens of thousands 
of federal defendants each year.14 Second, even though the Guidelines 
are advisory, overwhelming empirical evidence demonstrates how 
powerfully they influence the sentencing practice of federal judges.15 
And third, the Supreme Court has taken a consistently pragmatic 
approach in Guidelines cases, prizing their actual effect on sentencing 
practice over their technical designation as advisory. Because the 
Guidelines reliably and significantly influence the duration of 
deprivations of liberty, this Article argues the Due Process Clause 
 
.html (“I suspect that there are likely many hundreds, and perhaps even thousands, of current 
federal prisoners who do have strong Johnson claim[s].”). The Guidelines ranges of about 
2,000 defendants each year are enhanced as a result of a “career offender” designation. U.S. 
SENTENCING COMM’N, QUICK FACTS: CAREER OFFENDER (2012), http://www.ussc.gov 
/sites/default/files/pdf/research-and-publications/quick-facts/Quick_Facts_Career 
_Offender.pdf (reporting that 2232 individuals were sentenced in federal court as “career 
offenders” in 2012, and ninety-five percent of them had increased Guidelines ranges as a 
result). However, that does not mean anywhere near 2000 individuals per year would be 
entitled to Johnson relief. The residual clause is just one of several ways a career offender 
enhancement is triggered. The Sentencing Commission does not disaggregate sentencing 
enhancements based on how the defendant qualified as a career offender, so we do not know 
how many career offenders’ designations rest on past crime-of-violence convictions rather 
than controlled-substance convictions, much less what subset of the crime-of-violence 
determinations arose from the residual clause. Further complicating matters, some 
defendants subject to residual-clause enhancements still would qualify as career offenders 
on other grounds even if the residual clause were eliminated. Cf. United States v. Welch, 
683 F.3d 1304, 1313 (11th Cir. 2012) (finding it unnecessary to decide whether robbery 
qualified as a “crime of violence” under the “elements clause” of the ACCA statutory 
definition because the conviction “suffice[d] under the residual clause”). Moreover, how 
many defendants might be entitled to resentencing because of Johnson depends not just on 
the main question addressed in this article, whether the Guidelines can be challenged on 
vagueness grounds, but also on whether Johnson is retroactive on collateral review in 
Guidelines cases such that prisoners can challenge their sentences through petitions for 
habeas corpus. That second question, a full exploration of which is beyond the scope of this 
article, is itself the subject of a split in the courts. See infra, notes 177 and 180. 
14 See 2014 COMM’N REPORT, supra note 1. 
15 See Peugh v. United States, 133 S. Ct. 2072, 2084 (2013) (“Even after Booker rendered 
the Sentencing Guidelines advisory, district courts have in the vast majority of cases 
imposed either within-Guidelines sentences or sentences that depart downward from the 
Guidelines on the Government’s motion.”). 
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grants defendants the right to challenge the Guidelines on vagueness 
grounds.16 
I 
DUE PROCESS, VAGUENESS, AND JOHNSON 
Federal courts may strike down a statute as void for vagueness for 
“either of two independent reasons.”17 A law is unconstitutionally 
vague “if it fails to provide people of ordinary intelligence a reasonable 
opportunity to understand what conduct [the law] prohibits.”18 
 
16 I pause here to acknowledge the profusion of academic discourse regarding Johnson, 
and to explain the particular contribution of this Article to that discussion. Johnson was a 
big deal. See Erwin Chemerinsky, Chemerinsky: The Best, Worst, and Most Surprising 
SCOTUS Opinions of 2015, ABA J. DAILY NEWS (Jan. 7, 2016), http://www.abajournal 
.com/news/article/chemerinsky_top_highlights_from_2015_and_what_we_can_look_for 
_from_scotus_i (calling Johnson the “most important decision of the year for the federal 
courts”). As a result, much has been written about the decision. See, e.g., Douglas A. 
Berman, W[ha]t does Johnson mean for the past, present and future of the career offender 
guidelines?, Sentencing Law and Policy Blog (July 1, 2015), http://sentencing.typepad.com 
/sentencing_law_and_policy/2015/07/want-does-johnson-mean-for-the-past-present-and      
-future-of-the-career-offender-guidelines-.html (“In sum: Johnson + career offender 
guidelines = lots and lots of uncertainty and interpretive headaches.”); Leah M. Litman, 
Circuit Splits & Original Writs: What the Supreme Court Must Address—and Now—in the 
Wake of Johnson v. United States, CASETEXT (Dec. 17, 2015), https://casetext.com/posts 
/circuit-splits-original-writs; Leah M. Litman, Resentencing in the Shadow of Johnson v. 
United States, 28 FED. SENT’G REP. 45, 45 (2015); Carissa Byrne Hessick, Johnson v. United 
States and the Future of the Void-for-Vagueness Doctrine, 10 N.Y.U. J. L. & LIBERTY 152, 
158 (2016). Hessick and Berman also collaborated on an amicus brief, urging the Eleventh 
Circuit to reconsider en banc its determination the Guidelines cannot be challenged on 
vagueness grounds. Brief of Law Professors as Amicus Curiae in Support of Defendant-
Appellant United States v. Matchett, 802 F.3d 1185, 1185 (2015) (No. 14-10396), 2015 WL 
6723558, at *1. Many of these pieces simply point to the questions Johnson left open about 
the Guidelines’ residual clause without attempting to answer them. Others, notably the 
amicus brief and Litman’s Federal Sentencing Reporter article, dig into the question of the 
vagueness doctrine’s applicability to the Guidelines and either propose an answer (Berman 
and Hessick argue immunizing the Guidelines from vagueness challenges conflicts with 
Supreme Court vagueness and Guidelines precedent and is inconsistent with the structure of 
federal sentencing) or highlight interesting arguments on both sides (Litman notes the 
tension between the Supreme Court’s pragmatic approach to the influence of the sentencing 
Guidelines in Peugh v. United States and the Court’s determination that the Guidelines did 
not violate the Sixth Amendment so long as they are advisory.) Litman, 28 FED. SENT’G 
REP. at 46. This Article contributes to this body of work by taking a sustained look at the 
history of the Guidelines, the case law on the vagueness doctrine, and the underpinnings of 
the Due Process Clause, in an attempt to answer the broad question whether advisory 
sentencing guidelines may be challenged on vagueness grounds. 
17 Hill v. Colorado, 530 U.S. 703, 732 (2000). 
18 Id. 
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Alternatively, a statute is impermissibly vague “if it authorizes or 
even encourages arbitrary and discriminatory enforcement.”19 A law 
that falls into either category runs afoul of the Constitution’s guarantee 
of due process.20 These principles apply to criminal laws, including 
those that “fix sentences.”21 They also apply to civil laws so long as 
those laws reach “a substantial amount of constitutionally protected 
conduct.”22 The requirements of due process change depending on the 
restriction at issue: more process is due—i.e., more precision is 
required and less vagueness tolerated—as the deprivation becomes 
more serious.23 Thus, criminal laws must be more precise than 
economic regulations.24 
Johnson focused on whether a portion of the ACCA’s definition of 
“violent felony” was unconstitutionally vague.25 The statute “forbids 
certain people—such as convicted felons, persons committed to mental 
institutions, and drug users—to ship, possess, and receive firearms.”26 
The general penalty for violating this ban is up to ten years’ 
imprisonment.27 But if the defendant has “three or more earlier 
convictions for a ‘serious drug offense’ or a ‘violent felony,’” the 
 
19 Id. 
20 Courts disagree over whether vagueness violates substantive or procedural due 
process, but the weight of authority is with procedural due process. See ITT Educ. Servs., 
Inc. v. Arce, 533 F.3d 342, 348 (5th Cir. 2008); C.B. By and Through Breeding v. Discoll, 
82 F.3d 383, 388 n.4 (11th Cir. 1996); San Filippo v. Bongiovanni, 961 F.2d 1125, 1139 (3d 
Cir. 1992); United States v. Morrison, 844 F.2d 1057, 1070 n.19 (4th Cir. 1988); United 
States v. Prof. Air Traffic Controllers Org. (PATCO), Patco Local 202, 678 F.2d 1, 2 (1st 
Cir. 1982); S. Ohio Coal Co. v. United Mine Workers of Am., 551 F.2d 695, 705 n.11 (6th 
Cir. 1977). But see Richmond Boro Gun Club, Inc. v. City of New York, 97 F.3d 681, 689 
(2d Cir. 1996) (“When the legislature passes a law which affects a general class of persons, 
those persons have all received procedural due process—the legislative process. The 
challenges to such laws must be based on their substantive compatibility with constitutional 
guarantees.”); see also Johnson v. United States, 135 S. Ct. 2551, 2569–70 (2015) (Thomas, 
J., dissenting) (linking the vagueness doctrine to substantive due process jurisprudence and 
questioning the validity of vagueness as a due process concept). 
21 Johnson, 135 S. Ct. at 2557. 
22 Vill. of Hoffman Estates v. Flipside, Hoffman Estates, Inc., 455 U.S. 489, 494 (1982). 
23 See Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319, 335 (1976) (considering the nature of “the 
private interest that will be affected by the official action” in determining what due process 
requires). 
24 Vill. of Hoffman Estates, 455 U.S. at 498; see also Johnson, 135 S. Ct. at 2577 (Alito, 
J., dissenting) (arguing that because “[t]he fear is that vague laws will trap the innocent,” 
the vagueness doctrine “has less force when it comes to sentencing provisions, which come 
into play only after the defendant has been found guilty of the crime in question” (quotation 
marks and citation omitted)). 
25 Johnson, 135 S. Ct. at 2555. 
26 Id. (citing 18 U.S.C. § 922(g) (2012)). 
27 18 U.S.C. § 924(a)(2) (2012). 
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ACCA imposes a minimum prison term of 15 years and a maximum 
prison term of life.28 The definition of “violent felony” thus took on 
tremendous significance for a set of criminal defendants. The ACCA 
defines “violent felony” as: 
any crime punishable by imprisonment for a term exceeding one year 
. . . that—(i) has as an element the use, attempted use, or threatened 
use of physical force against the person of another; or (ii) is burglary, 
arson, or extortion, involves use of explosives, or otherwise involves 
conduct that presents a serious potential risk of physical injury to 
another.29 
Pursuant to the statute, a defendant’s prior conviction thus may 
qualify as a “violent felony” under three circumstances: (1) if the crime 
meets the elements test of subsection (i); (2) if the crime is one of the 
enumerated offenses listed in the first part of subsection (ii); or (3) if 
the crime falls within the final, italicized catch-all provision, which has 
come to be known as the residual clause.30 
Certain criminal convictions easily meet the requirements of one of 
the first two categories. Often, however, the federal courts were left to 
parse a state statute to determine whether crimes such as unlawful 
restraint,31 vehicular flight,32 theft of firearms from a licensed dealer,33 
or criminal recklessness34 fell within the residual clause. Because 
defendants in federal courts bring with them prior convictions under 
the criminal statutes of more than fifty states and territories, this 
interpretive task took on seemingly infinite variations. The results were 
inconsistent, creating “a black hole of confusion and uncertainty.”35 
Different courts reached different conclusions regarding whether 
nearly identical crimes qualified as residual-clause violent felonies.36 
 
28 Johnson, 135 S. Ct. at 2555 (citing 18 U.S.C. § 924(e)(1) and Johnson v. United States, 
559 U.S. 133, 136 (2010)). 
29 18 U.S.C. § 924(e)(2)(B) (emphasis added). 
30 See, e.g., United States v. Schmidt, 623 F.3d 257, 265 (5th Cir. 2010) (describing the 
ACCA’s “three disjunctive prongs, under any one of which an offense may be deemed a 
crime of violence”). 
31 See Harrington v. United States, 689 F.3d 124, 133 (2d Cir. 2012). 
32 United States v. Petite, 703 F.3d 1290, 1296–97 (11th Cir. 2013). 
33 See Schmidt, 623 F.3d at 265. 
34 See United States v. Smith, 544 F.3d 781, 786 (7th Cir. 2008). 
35 United States v. Vann, 660 F.3d 771, 787 (4th Cir. 2011) (Agee, J., concurring). 
36 Compare, e.g., United States v. Montgomery, 402 F.3d 482, 488–49 (5th Cir. 2005) 
(holding that the Texas statute criminalizing retaliation against government officials does 
not involve conduct that presents a serious potential risk of physical injury to another 
because the harm threatened need not be physical), with United States v. Sawyers, 409 F.3d 
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Splits appeared over not only whether the clause applied to a particular 
crime, but also “the nature of the inquiry one is supposed to conduct 
and the kinds of factors one is supposed to consider.”37 Underscoring 
the problem, the Supreme Court dove into the fray four times between 
2007 and 2011, attempting to provide guidance to lower courts.38 
Instead of fostering uniformity, these decisions engendered further 
splits.39 In each of the first three cases, dissenting or concurring justices 
bemoaned the Sisyphean task of determining whether the residual 
clause applied to a given crime.40 Finally, in Sykes v. United States, 
Justice Scalia expressly argued in dissent that the residual clause was 
insufficiently precise to survive a constitutional vagueness challenge.41 
In Johnson, the constitutional reasoning of Justice Scalia’s Sykes 
dissent garnered a six-justice majority. Because it was “convinced that 
the indeterminacy of the wide-ranging inquiry required by the residual 
clause both denies fair notice to defendants and invites arbitrary 
enforcement by judges,” the Court struck down the clause, holding that 
“[i]ncreasing a defendant’s sentence under the clause denies due 
process of law.”42 
After Johnson, it is clear that federal defendants’ statutory 
sentencing ranges can no longer be enhanced because their prior 
convictions qualify as residual-clause violent felonies. But Johnson left 
a number of questions unanswered. One of those questions is whether 
various similarly worded statutory phrases will be struck down as void 
 
732, 742–43 (6th Cir. 2005) (holding that the Tennessee statute with virtually identical text 
qualified as a violent felony under the residual clause). 
37 Johnson v. United States, 135 S. Ct. 2551, 2559–60 (2015). 
38 Sykes v. United States, 131 S. Ct. 2267, 2270 (2011); Chambers v. United States, 555 
U.S. 122, 123 (2009); Begay v. United States, 553 U.S. 137, 141 (2008); James v. United 
States, 550 U.S. 192, 195 (2007). 
39 See United States v. Martin, 753 F.3d 485, 495 (4th Cir. 2014) (Diaz, J., concurring) 
(“The Supreme Court has struggled mightily to make sense of this sphinx-like provision, 
but the clause remains an elusive target.”). 
40 Chambers, 555 U.S. at 132 (Alito, J., concurring) (opining that after twenty years, 
“only one thing is clear: ACCA’s residual clause is nearly impossible to apply 
consistently”); Begay, 553 U.S. at 150 (Scalia, J., concurring) (criticizing the Court’s 
“piecemeal, suspenseful, Scrabble-like approach to the interpretation of” the residual 
clause); James, 550 U.S. at 216–17 (Scalia, J., dissenting) (characterizing the residual clause 
as, “to put it mildly, not a model of clarity”). 
41 Sykes, 131 S. Ct. at 2287 (Scalia, J., dissenting) (“We have demonstrated by our 
opinions that the clause is too vague to yield ‘an intelligible principle,’ . . . . [E]ach attempt 
to ignore that reality producing a new regime that is less predictable and more arbitrary than 
the last.”). 
42 Johnson, 135 S. Ct. at 2557. 
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for vagueness.43 Another of those questions is whether the residual 
clause of the Guidelines, found at U.S.S.G. § 4B1.2(a)(2), is also 
unconstitutionally vague. 
In every criminal sentencing in federal court, the sentencing judge 
must calculate an advisory sentencing range pursuant to the Guidelines. 
This advisory range is increased when the defendant is a career 
offender.44 Career offender, in turn, is defined as an individual whose 
instant offense was either a crime of violence or a controlled substance 
offense and who has at least two prior convictions for crimes of 
violence or controlled substance offenses.45 The Guidelines’ definition 
of crime of violence is substantially the same as the ACCA definition 
of violent felony. The Guidelines define crime of violence as the 
following: 
[A]ny offense under federal or state law, punishable by imprisonment 
for a term exceeding one year, that—(1) has as an element the use, 
attempted use, or threatened use of physical force against the person 
of another, or (2) is burglary of a dwelling, arson, or extortion, 
involves use of explosives, or otherwise involves conduct that 
presents a serious potential risk of physical injury to another.46 
As noted, the two residual clauses are textually identical; as a result, 
federal courts have applied ACCA residual-clause precedent to 
Guidelines residual-clause cases, and vice versa.47 
At first glance, the question of Johnson’s applicability to the 
Guidelines residual clause seems straightforward: because the two 
residual clauses are textually identical, it is hard to see how one clause 
could comply with due process if the other violates it. But digging 
deeper, the issue is more complicated; as set forth in more detail in Part 
 
43 See, e.g., Dimaya v. Lynch, 803 F.3d 1110, 1114 (9th Cir. 2015) (striking down for 
vagueness 8 U.S.C. § 16(b), which makes a noncitizen removable from the United States if 
she is convicted of a felony that “by its nature[] involves a substantial risk that physical force 
against the person or property of another may be used in the course of committing the 
offense”), cert. granted, No. 15–1498, 2016 WL 3232911 (Sept. 29, 2016); United States v. 
Hernandez-Lara, 817 F.3d 651, 653 (9th Cir. 2016) (holding that, pursuant to Dimaya, the 
portion of U.S Sentencing Guidelines that incorporates by reference the vague text from 
section 16(b) must be stricken). 
44 U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES § 4B1.1(B) (U.S. SENTENCING COMM’N 2015). 
45 Id. § 4B1.1(a). As with the ACCA, the sentence enhancement also is triggered by 
certain drug offenses. Id. Prior “crime of violence” convictions also trigger enhancements 
under other provisions of the Guidelines. See id. § 2K1.3 & cmt. n.2; id. § 2K2.1(a)(2) & 
cmt. n.1; id. § 2S1.1 & cmt. n.1; id. § 4A1.2(p); id. § 5K2.17 & cmt. n.1; id. § 7B1.1(a)(1) 
& cmt. n.2. 
46 Id. § 4B1.2(a) (emphasis added). 
47 See, e.g., United States v. Spencer, 724 F.3d 1133, 1138 (9th Cir. 2013). 
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II.D of this Article, a number of courts consider advisory Guidelines to 
be different from mandatory statutes in constitutionally significant 
ways. The arguments raised by those courts are far from frivolous. 
However, they are ultimately outweighed by the way the Guidelines as 
actually applied implicate the core concerns underlying the vagueness 
doctrine. To understand why, it is helpful to review a bit of history. 
II 
DUE PROCESS AND THE SENTENCING GUIDELINES 
A. History of the Sentencing Guidelines: Promulgation to Booker 
Until the 1980s, sentencing schemes in the United States were 
“indeterminate”: within the confines of any applicable statutory 
minimum or maximum, judges had broad discretion to set a term of 
imprisonment.48 The sentence generally was for a range of years rather 
than for a definite term.49 After an offender had served some portion of 
the sentence, a parole board would consider whether he was ready for 
release.50 The indeterminate sentencing schemes afforded both judges 
and parole boards broad discretion in an attempt to “individualize the 
treatment of offenders and facilitate rehabilitation . . . .”51 The idea was 
that a prisoner would be more motivated to rehabilitate himself if a 
shorter sentence were available as a reward. 
In the late 1970s and early 1980s, however, indeterminate 
sentencing came under fire for creating uncertainty and unwarranted 
sentencing disparities.52 These criticisms came from both sides of the 
political aisle; progressives derided indeterminate sentencing as 
racially discriminatory, while conservatives argued it gave judges 
 
48 BARBARA BELBOT ET AL., THE LEGAL RIGHTS OF THE CONVICTED 28 (LFB Scholarly 
Publishing 2d ed. 2015). 
49 Id. 
50 See, e.g., LYNN S. BRANHAM, THE LAW AND POLICY OF SENTENCING AND 
CORRECTIONS IN A NUTSHELL 116–17 (West 9th ed. 2013). For example, a statute might 
fix the available sentencing range for armed robbery between one and fifteen years’ 
imprisonment; a judge might sentence a defendant to a term of two to twelve years’ 
imprisonment; and the parole board would determine how much of that term the defendant 
actually would spend behind bars. LISA M. SEGHETTI & ALISON M. SMITH, CONG. 
RESEARCH SERV., FEDERAL SENTENCING GUIDELINES: BACKGROUND, LEGAL ANALYSIS, 
AND POLICY OPTIONS 8 (2005). 
51 SEGHETTI & SMITH, supra note 50, at 9. 
52 Id. See generally Peter W. Low, Marvin E. Frankel’s Criminal Sentences: Law 
Without Order New York: Hill & Wang (1973), 87 HARV. L. REV. 687 (1974) (book review) 
(summarizing criticisms of indeterminate sentencing). 
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leeway to be soft on crime.53 As a result of these critiques and general 
anxiety about the rising crime rate in the United States, in the 1970s 
state legislatures turned their attention to sentencing reform.54 Led by 
Minnesota, states began to replace their indeterminate sentencing 
schemes with “determinate” sentencing schemes, which either 
mandated or recommended particular sentencing ranges based on the 
seriousness of the crime and the offender’s criminal history.55 These 
reforms typically did not completely eliminate a judge’s discretion in 
selecting a sentence; Minnesota’s, for example, permitted departures 
from the guidelines if the judge justified the departure in writing.56 
Nonetheless, judges had significantly less discretion to select a 
sentence under the new determinate systems. The reforms were touted 
as a way to reduce sentencing disparities and promote cost-effective, 
just sentences.57 The changes thus were intended to promote fairness 
(similar offenders committing similar crimes receive similar 
punishments, a “just desserts” theory of sentencing) over 
individualized flexibility (reductions in punishment as a result of 
rehabilitation).58 
 
53 BELBOT ET AL., supra note 48, at 28; Michael W. McConnell, The Booker Mess, 83 
DENV. U. L. REV. 665, 680 (2006) (noting that shift to determinate sentencing was 
“originally the product of a remarkable cross-ideological consensus” that “the prior 
discretionary system violated principles of the rule of law”). 
54 SEGHETTI & SMITH, supra note 50, at 8. 
55 BELBOT ET AL., supra note 48, at 29–30; BRANHAM, supra note 50, at 104. 
56 BRANHAM, supra note 50, at 105–06. 
57 Id. at 106–07. Whether the reforms achieved these goals is a subject for a different 
article. Briefly, however, many commentators have argued determinate sentencing schemes 
do not so much eliminate discretion in sentencing as shift that discretion to another point in 
the process. See id. at 102, 114–15 (describing how prosecutors circumvent mandatory 
minimums by, for example, charging defendants with lesser crimes). It is well-documented 
that such discretion, like the discretion of sentencing judges, is widely exercised in a racially 
discriminatory manner. See generally Crystal S. Yang, Free At Last? Judicial Discretion 
and Racial Disparities in Federal Sentencing, 44 J. LEGAL STUD. 75 (2015); Sonja Starr & 
Marit Rehavi, Racial Disparity in the Criminal Justice Process: Prosecutors, Judges, and 
the Effects of United States v. Booker, L. & ECON. WORKING PAPERS, Paper 53 (Nov. 2012), 
http://repository.law.umich.edu/law_econ_current/53. 
58 BELBOT ET AL., supra note 48, at 29. As part of these reforms and the “tough on crime” 
movement, some states eliminated parole boards entirely or passed “truth in sentencing” 
laws designed to limit the boards’ ability to grant offenders early release. See PAULA M. 
DITTON & DORIS JAMES WILSON, U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE OFFICE OF JUSTICE PROGRAMS, 
TRUTH IN SENTENCING IN STATE PRISONS (Jan. 1999). In combination with other measures, 
including mandatory minimums and “three strikes” laws, these reforms ratcheted up 
criminal sentences, resulting in dramatically longer terms of imprisonment than had 
previously been the norm. See Low, supra note 52 (predicting this result); James M. 
Anderson, Jeffrey R. King & Kate Stith, Measuring Interjudge Sentencing Disparity: Before 
and After the Federal Sentencing Guidelines, 42 J.L. & ECON. 271, 294 (1999) (noting that 
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Congress took up sentencing reform several times in the 1970s,59 
but did not eliminate indeterminate sentencing in the federal system 
until passing the Sentencing Reform Act of 1984.60 Following the state 
trends, the law’s major goals were “to reduce the unwarranted 
disparities and unpredictability of indeterminate sentencing.”61 The 
Sentencing Reform Act expressly abandoned rehabilitation as a goal of 
criminal sentencing, instead citing “retribution, education, deterrence, 
and incapacitation” as the objectives of sentencing policy.62 In pursuit 
of those goals, the statute created the United States Sentencing 
Commission (the Commission), “an independent body within the 
judicial branch of the federal government . . . charged . . . with 
promulgating guidelines for federal sentences.”63 
The Commission was tasked with developing sentencing guidelines 
that fulfilled three congressional mandates: “‘honesty’ (the term 
imposed would be the term served), ‘uniformity’ (similar offenders 
would receive similar sentences for similar conduct), and 
‘proportionality’ (crimes of differing severity would receive different 
sentences).”64 Although the Commission is an independent body 
within the judiciary, some of its actions remain subject to legislative 
oversight. Most notably, the Commission annually submits to Congress 
proposed changes to the Guidelines, along with a proposed effective 
date for each amendment; the changes take effect absent congressional 
action to modify or disapprove them.65 
 
“overall sentence lengths are rising over time”); John R. Sutton, Symbol and Substance: 
Effects of California’s “Three Strikes” Law on Felony Sentencing, 47 L. & SOC’Y REV. 37, 
37 (2013) (including in the “important substantive impacts” of California’s “Three Strikes” 
law a measurable trend of harsher sentences, “particularly in conservative counties”); Aimée 
Tecia Canty, Note, A Return to Balance: Federal Sentencing Reform After the “Tough-on-
Crime” Era, 44 STETSON L. REV. 893, 909 (2015) (“The war on drugs and a focus on 
retributive punishment rather than treatment has resulted in astronomical increases in the 
number of people held in federal and state prisons and the amount of money spent on 
housing incarcerated persons.”). 
59 See, e.g., U.S. Congress, Senate Committee on the Judiciary, Criminal Code Reform 
Act of 1977, Report on S. 1437, 95th Cong., 1st sess., S. Rept. 95-605, part I, 10–15 (Govt. 
Print. Off. 1977). 
60 See SEGHETTI & SMITH, supra note 50, at 12 (referring to Chapter II of the 
Comprehensive Crime Control Act of 1984). 
61 ARTHUR W. CAMPBELL, THE LAW OF SENTENCING § 4.6 (West 3d ed. 2004). 
62 28 U.S.C. § 994(k) (2012); 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a) (2012); CAMPBELL, supra note 61, at 
§ 4.6; SEGHETTI & SMITH, supra note 50, at 13. 
63 SEGHETTI & SMITH, supra note 50, at 12; 28 U.S.C. §§ 991, 994, 995 (2012). 
64 CAMPBELL, supra note 61, at § 4.6 (quoting U.S. SENTENCING COMM’N, GUIDELINE 
MANUAL 2–3 (1989) [hereinafter GUIDELINE MANUAL]). 
65 28 U.S.C. § 994(p). 
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The central organizational scheme of the Guidelines is a grid. Along 
one axis of the grid is a “base offense level.”66 This is a number 
between one and forty-three, designed to reflect the seriousness of the 
offense for which the defendant is going to be sentenced.67 Along the 
other axis of the grid is a “criminal history category.”68 Determining 
the appropriate criminal history category involves adding up the points 
assigned to the defendant’s previous convictions under the 
Guidelines.69 The total number of points fits into one of a set of ranges 
corresponding to Roman numerals between I and VI.70 However, if the 
defendant is designated a “career offender,”71 that designation 
overrides the point-based criminal history category and automatically 
imposes category VI.72 
 
66 U.S SENTENCING GUIDELINES § 1B1.1(a)(2) (U.S. SENTENCING COMM’N 2015); see 
id. §§ 2A–2X; 1B1(b) (listing aggravating and mitigating circumstances for which the base 
offense level should be adjusted upward or downward); see also §§ 1B1.1(c); 3A1.1–1.4; 
3B1.1–1.3; 3C1.1; 3D1.1–1.5; 3E1.1 (victim’s status, offender’s role, obstruction of justice, 
multiple counts, acceptance of responsibility). 
67 See Notice of Promulgation of Temporary, Emergency Amendments to the Sentencing 
Guidelines and Commentary, 68 Fed. Reg. 3080, 3085 (Jan. 22, 2003) (amending base 
offense level for certain campaign finance crimes from 6 to 8 to reflect “the fact that these 
offenses . . . generally are more serious [than generic theft, property destruction, and fraud 
crimes] due to the additional harm, or potential harm, of corrupting the elective process”). 
68 U.S SENTENCING GUIDELINES § 1B1.1(a)(6) (U.S. SENTENCING COMM’N 2015). 
69 Id. § 4A1.1. 
70 Id. Ch. 5, pt. A. 
71 Id. § 4B1.1(a). 
72 Id. § 4B1.1(b). 
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Figure 1. Federal Sentencing Guidelines73 
After determining the adjusted offense level and criminal history 
category, the court consults the grid to find the place where the two 
intersect.74 The point of intersection provides the Guidelines range, 
which recommends a minimum and maximum term of imprisonment. 
The sentencing judge then selects a period of incarceration designed to 
serve a set of a statutory goals that include: the need to protect the 
 
73 U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL ch. 5, pt. A, sentencing tbl. (U.S. 
SENTENCING COMM’N, 2015). 
74 Id. § 1B1.1(g). 
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public from additional crimes committed by the defendant; the need to 
provide the defendant with correctional treatment, education, or 
vocational training, or medical care in the most effective manner; and 
the need for restitution.75 
When they were enacted, the Guidelines were mandatory; the statute 
provided “the court shall impose a sentence . . . within the [Guidelines] 
range . . . unless the court finds that there exists an aggravating or 
mitigating circumstance of a kind, or to a degree, not adequately taken 
into consideration by the Sentencing Commission in formulating the 
guidelines that should result in a sentence different from that 
described.”76 The statute further constrained judges’ discretion in 
determining whether to depart from the Guidelines range by directing 
judges to “consider only the sentencing guidelines, policy statements, 
and official commentary of the Sentencing Commission” in 
determining whether a particular “circumstance was adequately taken 
into consideration.”77 
The provisions of the law governing appellate review solidified the 
presumptive power of the Guidelines. If a judge imposed a sentence 
outside of the Guidelines range, the sentence could be appealed by the 
government (if it was below the Guidelines range)78 or the defendant 
(if it was above the Guidelines range).79 Non-Guidelines sentences 
could be overturned for a number of reasons, including because the 
district court failed to provide a written statement of reasons for the 
sentence;80 because the sentence departed “to an unreasonable degree 
from the applicable guidelines range”;81 or because the departure was 
“not justified by the facts of the case.”82 Appeals of within-Guidelines 
sentences, by contrast, were tightly constrained. Federal appellate 
courts had jurisdiction to hear appeals of Guidelines sentences under 
only two circumstances: if the sentence was imposed “in violation of 
the law” or if the sentence was imposed “as a result of an incorrect 
application of the sentencing Guidelines.”83 These statutory phrases, in 
turn, were narrowly construed. The D.C. Circuit Court, for example, 
 
75 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a) (2012); BRANHAM, supra note 50, at 109–10. 
76 18 U.S.C. § 3553(b)(1) (emphasis added). 
77 Id. 
78 Id. § 3742(b)(3). 
79 Id. § 3742(a)(3). 
80 Id. § 3742(e)(3)(A). 
81 Id. § 3742(e)(3)(C). 
82 Id. § 3742(e)(3)(B)(iii). 
83 Id. §§ 3742(a)(1)–(2), (b)(1)–(2). 
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stated that a district judge’s refusal to impose a below-Guidelines 
sentence likely only would be “in violation of the law” if the judge’s 
refusal rested on “some illegal reason, such as the defendant’s race or 
religion.”84 In the same case, the court mused, “[o]ne might wonder 
how a judge could ever misapply the Guidelines by refusing to impose 
a sentence outside the guideline range. Departures are discretionary.”85 
In sum, the statutory scheme made “all [federal] sentences basically 
determinate.”86 
Soon after the Guidelines’ introduction, defendants argued the 
implementation of the Guidelines triggered rights under the Due 
Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment. These challenges took the 
form of attacks on various Guidelines as void for vagueness. Three 
federal appellate courts held the Guidelines could not be challenged on 
vagueness grounds. The Fifth Circuit, for example, distinguished 
between “recidivism statutes that increase the statutory maximum 
penalty” and “sentence enhancement for recidivism pursuant to the 
Guidelines, which merely adjusts the applicable guideline sentence 
within the same statutory maximum.”87 The court held no due process 
notice rights attached to the latter: “Due process does not mandate . . . 
either notice, advice, or a probable prediction of where, within the 
statutory range, the guideline sentence will fall.”88 The Eighth Circuit 
reasoned that “[b]ecause there is no constitutional right to sentencing 
guidelines—or, more generally, to a less discretionary application of 
sentences than that permitted prior to the Guidelines—the limitations 
the Guidelines place on a judge’s discretion cannot violate a 
defendant’s right to due process by reason of being vague.”89 The Sixth 
Circuit reached the same conclusion.90 
By contrast, relying on the Supreme Court’s statement that “vague 
sentencing provisions may pose constitutional questions if they do not 
state with sufficient clarity the consequences of violating a given 
 
84 United States v. Sammoury, 74 F.3d 1341, 1343 (D.C. Cir. 1996). 
85 Id. 
86 Mistretta v. United States, 488 U.S. 361, 367 (1989); see also Irizarry v. United States, 
553 U.S. 708, 713 (2008) (explaining that, pre-Booker, “the Guidelines were mandatory” 
and “the Sentencing Reform Act . . . prohibited district courts from disregarding the 
mechanical dictates of the Guidelines except in narrowly defined circumstances” (quotation 
marks omitted)). 
87 United States v. Pearson, 910 F.2d 221, 223 (5th Cir. 1990). 
88 Id. 
89 United States v. Wivell, 893 F.2d 156, 160 (8th Cir. 1990). 
90 United States v. Smith, 73 F.3d 1414, 1418 (6th Cir. 1996). 
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criminal statute,”91 the Ninth Circuit concluded the Guidelines could 
be challenged on vagueness grounds.92 At least four other appellate 
courts entertained vagueness challenges to the Guidelines without 
acknowledging or addressing the underlying constitutional question.93 
State courts, like federal courts, were split on the applicability of the 
Due Process Clause to state-law sentencing guideline schemes.94 But 
before the United States Supreme Court could resolve the split, a series 
of cases fundamentally altered the Guidelines. 
B. Booker and the Shift to an Advisory Scheme 
In 2000 and 2004, the United States Supreme Court decided the 
watershed Sixth Amendment cases Apprendi v. New Jersey95 and 
Blakely v. Washington.96 In Apprendi, the defendant challenged a New 
Jersey statute that permitted judges to increase the maximum term of 
imprisonment if they found by a preponderance of the evidence that 
certain aggravating factors were present.97 The Court struck down the 
statute, holding it violated the Sixth Amendment’s guarantee of a right 
to a trial by jury.98 In Blakely, the Court struck down a Washington 
statute permitting a judge to increase the maximum term of 
imprisonment if he or she found beyond a reasonable doubt the crime 
had been committed with “deliberate cruelty.”99 Commentators widely 
predicted Apprendi and Blakely spelled the end of the Guidelines.100 
The following year, in United States v. Booker, the Supreme Court 
concluded the Sixth Amendment right to a jury trial applied to the 
 
91 United States v. Batchelder, 442 U.S. 114, 123 (1979). 
92 United States v. Johnson, 130 F.3d 1352, 1354 (9th Cir. 1997). 
93 E.g., United States v. Savin, 349 F.3d 27, 38 (2d Cir. 2003); United States v. 
Rutherford, 175 F.3d 899, 906 (11th Cir. 1999); United States v. Moore, No. 95-5586, 1997 
WL 71707 at *1 (4th Cir. Feb. 20, 1997) (unpublished); United States v. Jones, 979 F.2d 
317, 318–20 (3d Cir. 1992). 
94 Compare State v. Wilson, 980 P.2d 244, 250–51 (Wash. Ct. App. 1999), with State v. 
Givens, 332 N.W.2d 187, 189–90 (Minn. 1983). 
95 530 U.S. 466, 497 (2000). 
96 542 U.S. 296, 305 (2004). 
97 Apprendi, 530 U.S. at 468–69. 
98 Id. at 497. 
99 Blakely, 542 U.S. at 313. 
100 See, e.g., Nancy J. King & Susan R. Klein, Beyond Blakely, 16 FED. SENT’G REP. 
316, 316 (2004) (stating that Blakely “threatens the operation of the Federal Sentencing 
Guidelines”); Robert Weisberg, Excerpts from “The Future of American Sentencing: A 
National Roundtable on Blakely,” 2 OHIO ST. J. CRIM. L. 619, 622 (2005) (describing the 
“virtually unanimous consensus at the Roundtable . . . that the Court would extend Blakely 
to the federal system”). 
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Guidelines and held the Sentencing Act was unconstitutional to the 
extent it made the Guidelines mandatory.101 The five-justice majority 
first reaffirmed judges could exercise discretion in sentencing without 
running afoul of the Sixth Amendment.102 But the Court held the 
Guidelines fundamentally altered this usual, constitutionally 
permissible exercise of discretion.103 Their binding nature gave the 
Guidelines “the force and effect of laws.”104 The availability of 
departures from the Guidelines in some cases did not remedy the Sixth 
Amendment problem, because “departures [we]re not available in 
every case, and in fact [we]re unavailable in most.”105 The Guidelines 
could not survive the constitutional challenge because they permitted 
imposition of “a sentence exceeding the maximum authorized by the 
facts established by a plea of guilty or a jury verdict” without requiring 
the facts supporting that enhanced sentence to be found by a jury 
beyond a reasonable doubt.106 
A different five-justice majority fashioned a remedy.107 It excised 
the provision of the Guidelines that rendered them mandatory, but left 
the Guidelines in place as advisory.108 Going forward, federal judges 
 
101 543 U.S. 220, 233 (2005). 
102 Id. (“[W]hen a trial judge exercises his discretion to select a specific sentence within 
a defined range, the defendant has no right to a jury determination of the facts that the judge 
deems relevant.”). 
103 See id. at 248. 
104 Id. at 234. 
105 Id. 
106 Id. at 244. 
107 Booker was an unusual Supreme Court opinion. The majority opinion is split into two 
parts, written by almost completely different five-justice majorities, with only Justice 
Ginsburg joining both majority opinions. Justice Stevens authored the Sixth Amendment 
portion of the opinion; he was joined by Justices Scalia, Souter, Thomas, and Ginsburg. Id. 
at 225–44. Justice Breyer authored a dissent, joined by Chief Justice Rehnquist and Justices 
O’Connor and Kennedy, arguing the Guidelines did not run afoul of the Sixth Amendment. 
Id. at 326–34. These four dissenters joined with Justice Ginsburg in the remedial portion of 
the majority opinion, which Justice Breyer wrote. Id. at 244–71. Justice Stevens, joined by 
Justice Souter in full and by Justice Scalia in part, dissented from Justice Breyer’s majority 
opinion. Id. at 271–303. Finally, Justices Scalia and Thomas filed their own dissents. Id. at 
303–27. The fact that eight of the nine Supreme Court justices believed a major part of the 
Booker opinion was wrong underscores the difficulty of interpreting the opinion of the Court 
as a cohesive whole. See McConnell, supra note 53, at 680 (“Few legal observers have 
praised the Booker opinions, at least in tandem, for their logical and doctrinal quality.”). 
108 Booker, 543 U.S. at 258–60. 
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would be required to consider the Guidelines range, but they would not 
be required to follow it in imposing a sentence.109 
How different would federal sentencing look under this new, 
advisory system? After Booker, there was wide disagreement. Some 
judges hewed very closely to the old, mandatory system, while others 
felt Booker permitted them a near-total return to the prior indeterminate 
sentencing system.110 Some judges began to consider characteristics 
they had been barred from considering under the mandatory Guidelines 
system, such as family history, lack of guidance as a youth, and 
disadvantaged background.111 The Sentencing Commission opined 
Booker required courts to give “substantial weight to the Federal 
Sentencing Guidelines in determining the appropriate sentence to 
impose.”112 Some commentators predicted a “return to a sentencing 
system characterized by unfairness and inconsistency.”113 Others 
characterized Booker’s effect on federal sentencing practice as 
“strikingly modest” and predicted the Guidelines would “remain the 
predominant factor in determining individual sentences for years to 
come.”114 Still others forecasted a gradual shift away from the 
Guidelines, eventually reaching a point where judges who “gr[e]w up 
on [a] fully voluntary guidelines system . . . [will] start to use more and 
more of their discretionary powers.”115 
 
109 Id. See generally SEGHETTI & SMITH, supra note 50, at 5–6 (describing the Apprendi, 
Blakely, and Booker decisions’ effect on the Guidelines); BELBOT ET AL., supra note 48, at 
38–40. 
110 See Gilles R. Bissonnette, Comment, “Consulting” the Federal Sentencing 
Guidelines After Booker, 53 UCLA L. REV. 1497, 1521–22 (2006) (describing the 
emergence of “two divergent views” in the federal judiciary and discussing whether the 
Guidelines “should be the dominant factor in any sentencing analysis” or “should merely be 
consulted along with the [other] relevant sentencing factors enumerated by Congress”); 
Becky Gregory & Traci Kenner, A New Era in Federal Sentencing, 68 TEX. B.J. 796, 800 
(2005) (collecting cases applying each approach). 
111 Gregory & Kenner, supra note 110, at 800. 
112 Subcommittee on Crime, Terrorism, and Homeland Security, 109th Cong. 4, 17 FED. 
SENT. REP. 299, 300 (2005) (prepared testimony of Judge Ricardo H. Hinojosa, Chair, 
United States Sentencing Commission). 
113 Gregory & Kenner, supra note 110, at 800. 
114 Frank O. Bowman, III, The Year of Jubilee . . . or Maybe Not: Some Preliminary 
Observations About the Operation of the Federal System After Booker, 43 HOUSTON L. 
REV. 279, 319 (2006). 
115 Steven L. Chanenson, The Next Era of Sentencing Reform, 54 EMORY L.J. 377, 411 
(2005). 
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Jurisprudential developments have created a new framework for the 
Guidelines.116 The Supreme Court held a district court is barred from 
presuming a within-Guidelines sentence is reasonable; instead, each 
case must be assessed individually.117 Courts of appeals, however, may 
apply a presumption of reasonableness to a within-Guidelines sentence 
because: 
[B]y the time an appeals court is considering a within-Guidelines 
sentence on review, both the sentencing judge and the Sentencing 
Commission will have reached the same conclusion as to the proper 
sentence in the particular case. That double determination 
significantly increases the likelihood that the sentence is a reasonable 
one.118 
By contrast, courts of appeals are not permitted to apply a 
presumption of unreasonableness for outside-Guidelines sentences.119 
In all cases, “[a]s a matter of administration and to secure nationwide 
consistency, the Guidelines should be the starting point and the initial 
benchmark.”120 For this reason, failure to calculate the correct range 
constitutes reversible procedural error.121 
The Court acknowledged these rules might “encourage sentencing 
judges to impose Guideline[] sentences.”122 Justice Stevens stated: “I 
am not blind to the fact that, as a practical matter, many federal judges 
continued to treat the Guidelines as virtually mandatory after our 
decision in Booker.”123 Dissenting from the decision sanctioning the 
appellate presumption of reasonableness for within-Guidelines 
sentences, Justice Souter predicted “a presumption of Guidelines 
reasonableness would tend to produce Guidelines sentences almost as 
regularly as mandatory Guidelines had done.”124 
 
116 For a thorough discussion of how principles of appellate review apply differently in 
the post-Booker federal sentencing context, see generally Carissa Byrne Hessick & F. 
Andrew Hessick, Appellate Review of Sentencing Decisions, 60 ALA. L. REV. 1, 18–25 
(2008). 
117 Nelson v. United States, 555 U.S. 350, 352 (2009) (per curiam). 
118 Rita v. United States, 551 U.S. 338, 347 (2007). 
119 Gall v. United States, 552 U.S. 38, 51 (2007). 
120 Id. at 49. 
121 Id. at 51. 
122 Rita, 551 U.S. at 354. 
123 Id. at 366 (Stevens, J., concurring). 
124 Id. at 390 (Souter, J., dissenting). But see id. at 366 (Stevens, J., concurring) (opining 
Justice Souter “overestimates the ‘gravitational pull’ toward the advisory Guidelines that 
will result from a presumption of reasonableness”). 
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C. Assessing the Effects of the Post-Booker Guidelines 
A decade after Booker, we can look to federal sentencing data to 
ascertain some differences between the mandatory and advisory 
Guidelines. Based on that data, the post-Booker Guidelines can be 
summed up in two broad statements. First, although the share of below-
Guidelines sentences has increased since Booker, it does not appear that 
Booker is responsible for that change. And second, it is clear that even 
post-Booker, the Guidelines continue to exert tremendous power over 
federal sentences. 
In the years immediately preceding Booker, about seventy percent 
of offenders sentenced in the federal system received within-
Guidelines sentences; now, that figure has dropped below fifty 
percent.125 In fiscal year 2014, “78.5 percent of all [federal] sentences 
. . . were either within the applicable guidelines range, above the range, 
or below the rage [sic] at the request of the government.”126 In the years 
before Booker, between eighty-five and ninety-four percent of federal 
sentences fell into this group.127 In addition, sentences are, on the 
whole, shorter now than they were before Booker. The change has been 
small but measurable: in the year before Booker, the average term of 
imprisonment for a federal defendant was forty-six months; in fiscal 
year 2011, it was forty-three months.128 These trends do not appear, 
however, to be exclusively, or perhaps even directly, traceable to 
Booker.129 
Both trends—the rising share of non-Guidelines sentences and the 
declining length of the average sentence—predate Booker. Long-term 
tracking of federal sentencing practice from 1996 to 2012 shows a 
steady decrease in the percentage of within-Guidelines sentences and 
 
125 U.S. SENT’G COMM’N, REPORT ON THE CONTINUING IMPACT OF UNITED STATES V. 
BOOKER ON FEDERAL SENTENCING 69 (2012) [hereinafter 2012 BOOKER REPORT]; 2014 
COMM’N REPORT, supra note 1, at A-5 (showing that in fiscal year 2014, about forty-six 
percent of offenders received within-Guidelines sentences). 
126 2014 COMM’N REPORT, supra note 1, at A-5. 
127 Id. 
128 Amy Baron-Evans & Kate Stith, Booker Rules, 160 U. PA. L. REV. 1631, 1678 (2012). 
129 It is, of course, difficult if not impossible to pin down causation here with certainty. 
A number of factors apart from Booker appear to have contributed to the decrease in within-
Guidelines sentences and the corresponding increase in non-Guidelines sentences. For 
example, the U.S. Sentencing Commission noted in its 2014 Annual Report that “the 2014 
data shows a noticeable decrease in the within range rate of sentences imposed in drug 
trafficking cases,” including “an increase in the rates for . . . government-sponsored below 
range sentences . . . in those cases. This decrease appears to be attributable to anticipation 
of the Commission’s 2014 drug amendment lowering the base offense levels for drug 
trafficking case[s].” 2014 COMM’N REPORT, supra note 1, at A-5. 
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a steady increase in below-Guidelines sentences.130 Similarly, the 
average sentence length has slowly, steadily decreased over the past 
two decades, with no apparent acceleration in the rate of change after 
Booker was decided.131 There is an upward “bump” in these trends, but 
it does not align with the Booker decision. Instead, this “bump” occurs 
pre-Booker and appears attributable to a Congressional amendment 
which “ordered the [Sentencing] Commission to ‘substantially 
reduce[]’ the incidence of judicial downward departures” from the 
Guidelines and imposed a stricter standard of review for out-of-
Guidelines sentences.132 Booker, of course, mooted these changes, and 
the “bump” accordingly dissipated. In sum, although there is a steady 
downward trend in the average term of imprisonment and a steady 
upward trend in the percentage of non-Guidelines sentences, those 
trends predate Booker and do not appear to have been significantly 
accelerated by Booker. 
Notwithstanding these trends, it is clear that the Guidelines continue 
to exert enormous influence over sentences.133 As explained above, in 
 
130 2012 BOOKER REPORT, supra note 125, at 69 (2012); Gregory & Kenner, supra note 
110, at 798. 
131 See Frank O. Bowman, III, Dead Law Walking: The Surprising Tenacity of the 
Federal Sentencing Guidelines, 51 HOUS. L. REV. 1227, 1235–36 figs.1A &1B, 1236 fig.2 
(2014) [hereinafter Bowman] (tracking mean and median sentences from 2000 to 2012). 
The average length of sentence, considered in a vacuum, tells us nothing about the influence 
of the Guidelines. It is noteworthy here only because pre-Booker criticism of the Guidelines 
focused on the Guidelines’ supposed harshness; many commentators predicted a dramatic 
drop in average sentence length post-Booker once judges were unfettered by mandatory 
directives. As noted, though there has been a measurable decline in sentence length, it has 
been “negligible.” McConnell, supra note 53, at 676. 
132 Baron-Evans & Stith, supra note 128, at 1665 (second alteration in original). 
133 A number of scholars have attempted to explain why an advisory system continues to 
produce sentences that hew so closely to the Guidelines. One part of the answer appears to 
be a question of focus: as one commentator explained, “[t]his early issue of post-Booker 
sentencing turned away from the question: ‘How well does the recommendation comply 
with the statutory factors?,’ and substituted ‘How mandatorily should the guidelines still be 
treated?’ Analysis focused on the proper degree of judicial ‘discretion’ rather than the 
reasonableness of the guidelines’ recommendations.” Paul J. Hofer, Beyond the 
“Heartland”: Sentencing Under the Advisory Federal Guidelines, 49 DUQ. L. REV. 675, 
690 (2011). Another part of the answer is that guidelines, even advisory ones, create 
“anchoring bias”—a phenomenon where sentencing judges’ mere awareness of 
recommendations causes them to view those recommendations as a norm. See, e.g., Mark 
W. Bennett, Confronting Cognitive “Anchoring Effect” and “Blind Spot” Biases in Federal 
Sentencing: A Modest Solution for Reforming a Fundamental Flaw, 104 J. CRIM. L. & 
CRIMINOLOGY 489, 502–11 (2014) (summarizing studies documenting anchoring bias in 
judges); Daniel M. Isaacs, Note, Baseline Framing in Sentencing, 121 YALE L.J. 426, 439–
43 (2011). Finally, as one commentator has observed, “[j]udges faced with the task [of 
quantifying punishment for crime] are acutely aware of the inevitable subjectivity of the 
exercise and are customarily grateful for standards provided by officially anointed experts, 
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2014, nearly half of sentences were within the applicable Guidelines 
range, and a large majority of sentences were either within-Guidelines 
or below-Guidelines at the government’s request.134 In a series of 
reports, the Commission has tracked federal sentencing trends after 
Booker. The most recent report, released in 2012, stated “the guidelines 
have remained the essential starting point for all federal sentences and 
have continued to influence sentences significantly.”135 After 
reviewing sentencing statistics both pre- and post-Booker, the report 
goes on to conclude there is “relative stability over time in the 
relationship between the average guideline minimum and the average 
sentence for offenses in the aggregate.”136 
The best evidence of the Guidelines’ continuing influence is how 
closely sentences track the Guidelines. This can be measured by 
examining the relationship between the Guidelines range and the 
sentence actually imposed. If a Guidelines-range increase results in a 
corresponding increase in sentencing practice, that is powerful 
evidence the Guidelines are “anchoring” sentences even as those 
sentence are more likely to diverge from the Guidelines.137 Here, the 
statistics are remarkably steady both pre- and post-Booker. The average 
sentence length for all cases in both time periods is about ten months 
 
even if they may not always agree with the experts in particular cases.” Bowman, supra note 
131, at 1269. 
134 See also Jon O. Newman, Easing Mandatory Minimums Will Not Be Enough, 100 
JUDICATURE 28, 28 (2016) (noting “federal judges impose a sentence within the calculated 
range in nearly half of all cases, and impose a sentence within or above the range (or below 
when the government requests a cooperation reduction) in more than three-quarters of all 
cases,” and arguing this continuing influence means revisions to the Guidelines will be 
necessary to ensure reforms designed to ease mandatory minimums have their intended 
effect). 
135 2012 BOOKER REPORT, supra note 125, at 60; see also United States v. Turner, 548 
F.3d 1094, 1099 (D.C. Cir. 2008) (“It is hardly surprising that most federal sentences fall 
within Guidelines ranges even after Booker—indeed, the actual impact of Booker on 
sentencing has been minor.”). 
136 2012 BOOKER REPORT, supra note 125, at 60. 
137 Interestingly, early evidence from a particular set of cases suggested the Guidelines’ 
influence would be substantially diminished after Booker. These so-called Booker “pipeline 
cases” were “cases in which the defendant was sentenced prior to Booker but the case was 
not yet final, usually because it was on appeal.” McConnell, supra note 53, at 667. Judge 
Michael O’Connell, from the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit, published a 
statistical analysis of the results in pipeline cases remanded for resentencing. See id. 
Upwards of twenty percent of defendants in these remands received a reduced sentence. Id. 
at 669–70. The Tenth Circuit reversed and remanded for resentencing approximately one-
third of Booker pipeline cases, and roughly two-thirds of those received a decreased sentence 
on remand. Id. at 668, 670 fig.3. The analysis was drawn from an admittedly small sample 
size and complicated by the standards of review applicable in different cases. See id. at 667–
68. In any case, no effect of this size materialized in the post-Booker sentencing statistics. 
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below the average Guidelines range.138 The power of the Guidelines is 
even clearer when the data is distilled by offense type, where the 
advisory Guidelines range and the average sentence imposed often 
track one another in “nearly perfect tandem.”139 There are exceptions. 
For example, the Guidelines appear to exert significantly less influence 
for economic crimes.140 Moreover, as was true before Booker, the 
relationship between the Guidelines range and the sentence imposed 
varies from district to district and judge to judge.141 Overall, however, 
“[t]he endurance of the Guidelines, but more particularly the degree to 
which they continue to drive actual sentences, has surprised nearly 
everyone.”142 
In Peugh v. United States,143 the Supreme Court explicitly 
acknowledged the Guidelines’ continuing influence. The defendant in 
Peugh was convicted of engaging in a check-kiting scheme in 1999 and 
2000.144 He was not sentenced, however, until 2010.145 The district 
court applied the Guidelines in effect at the time of sentencing, 
resulting in a range of seventy to eighty-seven months’ imprisonment, 
and sentenced the defendant to seventy months in prison.146 The court 
rejected the defendant’s argument that he was constitutionally entitled 
to have his Guidelines range calculated using the Guidelines in effect 
at the time he committed the crimes.147 The difference was significant: 
under the Guidelines in effect in 1999 and 2000, the applicable range 
would have been thirty to thirty-seven months’ imprisonment.148 
The defendant argued the application of the 2010 Guidelines range 
in his case violated the Ex Post Facto Clause of the United States 
 
138 Id. at 1677. 
139 Bowman, supra note 131, at 1249–50; see also id. at 1245–49 figs.10 & 14 (showing 
the relationship between the Guidelines range and average sentence for various offense 
types). 
140 Id. at 1250–51; see also id. at 1249 fig.14. 
141 See McConnell, supra note 53, at 673 (“The Tenth Circuit district courts were 
significantly more Guidelines-compliant than the national average prior to Booker, and have 
exercised their Booker discretion less aggressively than their counterparts in other circuits, 
in both downward and upward directions.”); Bowman, supra note 131, at 1261 (“[A] few 
districts adhere to the Guidelines as much or even more than they ever did, while in others 
the rate of Guidelines compliance has fallen by 40%–50%.”). 
142 Id. at 1268. 
143 133 S. Ct. 2072, 2084 (2013). 
144 Id. at 2078. 
145 Id. 
146 Id. at 2079. 
147 Id. 
148 Id. at 2078. 
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Constitution.149 That clause proscribes “[e]very law that changes the 
punishment, and inflicts a greater punishment, than the law annexed to 
the crime, when committed.”150 The clause ensures “individuals have 
fair warning of applicable laws” and “safeguards a fundamental 
fairness interest.”151 In evaluating an ex post facto challenge, the 
“touchstone of [the Supreme] Court’s inquiry is whether a given 
change in law presents a ‘sufficient risk of increasing the measure of 
punishment attachment to the covered crimes.’”152 The government 
argued the post-Booker Guidelines could never violate the Ex Post 
Facto Clause because they were merely advisory.153 
The Court disagreed.154 Its reasoning was rooted in a pragmatic 
assessment of the Guidelines’ continuing influence over sentencing: 
[The defendant] points to considerable empirical evidence indicating 
that the Sentencing Guidelines have the intended effect of influencing 
the sentences imposed by judges. Even after Booker rendered the 
Sentencing Guidelines advisory, district courts have in the vast 
majority of cases imposed either within-Guidelines sentences or 
sentences that depart downward from the Guidelines on the 
Government’s motion . . . . Moreover, the Sentencing Commission’s 
data indicate that when a Guidelines range moves up or down, 
offenders’ sentences move with it . . . . The federal system adopts 
procedural measures intended to make the Guidelines the lodestone 
of sentencing.155 
In short, the Peugh Court refused to reject an ex post facto challenge 
simply because every sentencing judge had the authority to depart from 
the Guidelines. The Court was convinced that the relevant 
consideration was the Guidelines’ actual effect on sentencing 
practices. 
The Court underscored its commitment to a pragmatic assessment of 
the Guidelines’ effect on sentences in Molina-Martinez v. United 
States.156 In Molina-Martinez, the Court considered when an 
incorrectly calculated Guidelines range is “plain error” within the 
meaning of Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 52(b).157 Rule 52(b) 
 
149 Id. 
150 Calder v. Bull, 3 U.S. 386, 390 (1798). 
151 Peugh, 133 S. Ct. at 2085. 
152 Id. at 2082 (quoting Garner v. Jones, 529 U.S. 244, 250 (2000)). 
153 Id. at 2085. 
154 Id. at 2088. 
155 Id. at 2084. 
156 136 S. Ct. 1338 (2016). 
157 Id. at 1342–43. 
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governs appellate review of errors the defendant failed to “br[ing] to 
the court’s attention” through an objection.158 A reviewing court has 
discretion to consider arguments regarding such “forfeited” errors only 
if the error was “obvious” and “affect[s] substantial rights.”159 
Typically, this requires the defendant to demonstrate “prejudice,” 
which the Court has defined as “a reasonable probability that, but for 
the error,” the outcome of the proceeding would have been different.160 
The Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals had created a categorical rule 
requiring a defendant seeking review of a forfeited sentencing error to 
show prejudice by introducing “additional evidence” beyond the 
incorrect Guidelines range itself.161 All eight justices rejected that 
categorical rule, and the six-justice majority held a defendant may show 
plain error simply by demonstrating his Guidelines range was (1) 
incorrect and (2) higher than the correct range.162 There is no separate 
requirement to make a further showing of prejudice, even when the 
sentence actually imposed falls within both the incorrect and correct 
ranges.163 
Just as in Peugh, the Court’s decision rested on “the real and 
pervasive effect the Guidelines have on sentencing.”164 Quoting 
heavily from Peugh, the Court summarized the statistics regarding the 
close relationship between the Guidelines range and the sentence 
actually imposed.165 The Court then went on to state: 
These sources confirm that the Guidelines are not only the starting 
point for most federal sentencing proceedings but also the lodestar. 
The Guidelines inform and instruct the district court’s determination 
of an appropriate sentence. In the usual case, then, the systemic 
function of the selected Guidelines range will affect the sentence          
. . . . From the centrality of the Guidelines in the sentencing process 
it must follow that, when a defendant shows that the district court 
used an incorrect range, he should not be barred from relief on appeal 
simply because there is no other evidence that the sentencing 
 
158 FED. R. CRIM. P. 52(b); Molina-Martinez, 136 S. Ct. at 1343. 
159 See United States v. Olano, 507 U.S. 725, 734, 735 (1993) (citations omitted). 
160 United States v. Dominguez Benitez, 542 U.S. 74, 76, 82 (2004). 
161 Molina-Martinez, 136 S. Ct. at 1344–45. 
162 Id. at 1345; see also id. at 1349 (Alito, J., concurring) (“I agree with the Court that 
the Fifth Circuit’s rigid approach to unpreserved Guidelines errors is incorrect.”). Justice 
Alito, writing for himself and Justice Thomas, took issue with the majority’s “speculat[ion] 
about how the reasonable probability test will be satisfied in future cases,” objecting to the 
implicit prediction “that sentencing judges will continue to rely very heavily on the 
Guidelines in the future[.]” Id.; see also supra note 107 and accompanying text. 
163 Molina-Martinez, 136 S. Ct. at 1345. 
164 Id. at 1346. 
165 Id. 
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outcome would have been different had the correct range been 
used.166 
The purpose of the Guidelines is to promote uniformity and 
proportionality.167 In Molina-Martinez, the Court concluded that, “[i]n 
the ordinary case the Guidelines accomplish their purpose.”168 Peugh 
and Molina-Martinez confirm that the Guidelines’ empirically-
demonstrated effect on sentences has legal consequences. With that 
driving principle in mind, I return to the vagueness doctrine. 
D. The Post-Johnson Circuit Split 
At the time Johnson was decided, the federal courts of appeals stood 
fractured on the question of vagueness challenges to the Guidelines: 
four courts had rejected such challenges outright;169 one court had 
squarely held the Constitution permitted such challenges;170 and at 
least four courts entertained such challenges without directly weighing 
in on the constitutional question.171 
Because Johnson was about a provision of a criminal statute, there 
was no reason for the Court to address this extant circuit split. Despite 
the lopsided split against permitting vagueness challenges to the 
Guidelines, however, early signs after Johnson suggested the 
Guidelines’ residual clause was doomed. To begin, the Supreme Court 
vacated and remanded, “for further consideration in light of Johnson,” 
the pending appeals of defendants whose sentences had been calculated 
using a residual clause-enhanced Guidelines range.172 Then, in those 
 
166 Id. 
167 Id. at 1342 (quoting Rita v. United States, 551 U.S. 338, 349 (2007)). 
168 Id. at 1349. 
169 United States v. Tichenor, 683 F.3d 358, 363–66, 365 n.3 (7th Cir. 2012); United 
States v. Smith, 73 F.3d 1414, 1418 (6th Cir. 1995); United States v. Pearson, 910 F.2d 221, 
223 (5th Cir. 1990); United States v. Wivell, 893 F.2d 156, 160 (8th Cir. 1990). The Seventh 
Circuit recently overruled Tichenor. See infra notes 214–219 and accompanying text. 
170 United States v. Johnson, 130 F.3d 1352, 1354 (9th Cir. 1997). 
171 United States v. Savin, 349 F.3d 27, 38–39 (2d Cir. 2003); United States v. 
Rutherford, 175 F.3d 899, 906 (11th Cir. 1999); United States v. Moore, No. 95-5586, 1997 
WL 71707, at *1 (4th Cir. Feb. 20, 1997); United States v. Jones, 979 F.2d 317, 318–20 (3d 
Cir. 1992). 
172 See, e.g., Beckles v. United States, 579 F. App’x 833, 833–34 (11th Cir. 2014), 
vacated, 135 S. Ct. 2928 (2015); United States v. Maldonado, 581 F. App’x 19, 22–23 (2d 
Cir. 2014), vacated, 135 S. Ct. 2929 (2015); see also United States Supreme Court, Order 
List: 576 U.S. (June 30, 2015), https://www.supremecourt.gov/orders/courtorders/063015 
zr_pnk0.pdf (remanding for reconsideration in light of Johnson forty-three criminal appeals 
and habeas petitions, including cases involving at least eight individuals whose advisory 
Guidelines ranges were increased pursuant to the Guidelines’ residual clause). However, 
these remand orders “ha[ve] no precedential weight and [do] not dictate how the lower court 
HEILMAN (DO NOT DELETE) 3/14/2017  9:43 AM 
80 OREGON LAW REVIEW [Vol. 95, 53 
and other pending appeals, the Department of Justice took the position 
that the Guidelines are susceptible to vagueness challenges and that 
Johnson invalidated the Guidelines’ residual clause.173 Finally, in 
response to Johnson, the Commission moved quickly to propose 
revisions to the Guidelines. Within six weeks of the decision in 
Johnson, the Commission announced a plan to “eliminate . . . the 
residual clause” in order to “make the guideline consistent with the 
Supreme Court’s recent decision in Johnson . . . .”174 The Commission 
followed through on that plan, proposing an amendment to section 
4B1.2(a)(2) that, among other changes, deletes the residual clause.175 
The amendment took effect August 1, 2016.176 For individuals 
sentenced now and in the future, Johnson sounded the death knell of 
the residual clauses of both the ACCA and the Guidelines. 
This does not render the question of Johnson’s effect on the 
Guidelines’ residual clause moot, though. The fates of hundreds of 
defendants with residual clause-enhanced Guidelines ranges remain 
uncertain.177 The amendment to the Guidelines eliminating the residual 
 
should rule on remand.” Texas v. United States, 798 F.3d 1108, 1116 (D.C. Cir. 2015) 
(citations omitted). 
173 See Government Supplemental Brief at *2, United States v. Matchett, No. 14-10396, 
(11th Cir. Aug. 27, 2015) (“Johnson’s constitutional holding . . . applies to the identically 
worded residual clause of the career offender guideline.”); accord Government 
Supplemental Brief at *2, United States v. Grayer, 2015 WL 4999426 (6th Cir. Aug. 20, 
2015); Government Supplemental Brief at *10, United States v. Madrid, 2015 WL 4985890 
(10th Cir. Aug. 20, 2015); Government Supplemental Brief. at *2, United States v. Lee, No. 
13-10507 (9th Cir. Aug. 17, 2015); Government Supplemental Brief at *6–*7, United States 
v. Pagán-Soto, 2015 WL 4872453 (1st Cir. Aug. 11, 2015). 
174 UNITED STATES SENTENCING COMM’N, News Release: U.S. Sentencing Commission 
Seeks Comment on Revisions to Definition of Crime of Violence (Aug. 7, 2015), 
http://www.ussc.gov/sites/default/files/pdf/news/press-releases-and-news-advisories-press 
-releases-20150 807_Press_Release.pdf. 
175 Notice of Submission to Congress of Amendment to the Sentencing Guidelines 
Effective August, 1, 2016, 81 Fed. Reg. 4741, 4743 (Jan. 27, 2016). 
176 Id. at 4741. 
177 There are two groups of individuals who seek to challenge the Guidelines’ residual 
clause after Johnson. The first group is composed of defendants whose convictions and 
sentences were pending on direct appeal when Johnson was decided; the second, and 
undoubtedly larger, group is composed of prisoners whose direct appeals have been 
exhausted and who must make their Johnson arguments through petitions for habeas corpus. 
For the first group, the main legal question is the one tackled in this Article: whether 
Johnson’s invalidation of the ACCA’s residual clause necessarily invalidates the 
Guidelines’ residual clause. The second group’s access to Johnson relief depends on both 
the answer to the first question and on whether Johnson is “retroactive” pursuant to Teague 
v. Lane, 489 U.S. 288, 301 (1989). As relevant here, Teague says a new constitutional rule 
is “retroactive”—that is, can be used to challenge a final sentence through a petition for 
habeas corpus—if it is a “substantive” rather than “procedural” rule and if the Supreme 
Court “made” the rule retroactive. In Welch v. United States, No. 15–6418, 2016 WL 
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clause is not retroactive, so it cannot alter sentences already being 
served.178 This means defendants already serving their sentences must 
seek resentencing through either an appeal or a petition for habeas 
corpus. Defendants’ ability to obtain resentencing under Johnson via 
these routes is in doubt because the federal courts disagree on both (1) 
 
1551144 (2016), the Supreme Court held Johnson announced a new substantive rule made 
retroactive on collateral review. As explained in note 173, supra, and accompanying text, 
the government has consistently conceded that Johnson’s holding invalidates the 
Guidelines’ residual clause on vagueness grounds. Even before Welch was decided, the 
government also conceded that Johnson is retroactive in ACCA cases. See Welch, 136 S. Ct. 
at 1263 (“[T]he United States . . . agrees with Welch that Johnson is retroactive[.]”) 
However, the government has taken the position that Johnson is not retroactive on collateral 
review in Guidelines cases. See United States v. Willoughby, — F. Supp. 3d. —, 2015 WL 
7306338, *6 (N.D. Ohio Nov. 18, 2015) (“The Government admits Johnson establishes a 
new, retroactive substantive rule as to the ACCA, but nonetheless argues it creates nothing 
more than a non-retroactive procedural rule as to the Sentencing Guidelines.”). In support 
of this position, the government relies heavily on Hawkins v. United States, 724 F.3d 915, 
917 (7th Cir. 2013), in which the Seventh Circuit held that all “errors in applying the 
advisory guidelines are procedural” for purposes of the Teague retroactivity analysis. In 
response, advocates for prisoners seeking to use Johnson to challenge their Guidelines 
sentences on collateral review have pointed to a line of federal appellate cases in which 
courts—including the Seventh Circuit—have held Supreme Court decisions narrowing the 
ACCA’s definition of “violent felony” are retroactive to Guidelines cases on collateral 
review. See United States v. Doe, 810 F.3d 132, 154 & n.13 (3d Cir. 2015); Narvaez v. 
United States, 674 F.3d 621, 625–26 (7th Cir. 2011); Reina-Rodriguez v. United States, 655 
F.3d 1182, 1187 (9th Cir. 2011). After Welch, federal appellate courts are divided on 
whether Johnson is retroactive in Guidelines cases. Compare, e.g., In re Patrick, 833 F.3d 
584, 587 (6th Cir. 2016) (holding Johnson is retroactive in Guidelines cases) and In re 
Hubbard, 825 F.3d 225, 235 (4th Cir 2016) (same) with In re Griffin, 823 F.3d 1350, 1355 
(11th Cir. 2016) (holding Johnson is not retroactive in Guidelines cases) and In re Arnick, 
826 F.3d 787, 789 (5th Cir. 2016) (same). A full exploration of the retroactivity split is 
beyond the scope of this Article. However, on the last day of the October 2015 term, the 
Supreme Court granted certiorari in a case that may resolve both the split on the applicability 
of the vagueness doctrine to the Guidelines and the split on Johnson’s retroactivity in 
Guidelines cases. See Beckles v. United States, 136 S. Ct. 2510, 2510 (2016). 
178 The Commission has the authority to make amendments to the Guidelines retroactive. 
See United States v. Navarro, 800 F.3d 1104, 1108 (9th Cir. 2015) (discussing retroactive 
amendments to the Guidelines ranges designed to ameliorate discrepancies in the advisory 
sentencing ranges for powder and crack cocaine). The amendment to the residual clause is 
not retroactive. Douglas Berman posits this may be because the Commission decided 
retroactive application “could prove almost administratively impossible.” Douglas A. 
Berman, US Sentencing Commission Promulgates “Johnson fix” Guideline Amendment and 
Proposes Many Other Notable Amendments, SENT’G L. & POL’Y BLOG (Jan. 8, 2016), 
http://sentencing.typepad.com/sentencing_law_and_policy/2016/01/us-sentencing-commis 
sion-promulgates-johnson-fix-guideline-amendment-and-proposes-many-other-notable 
.html. This is presumably a reference to the difficulty of determining whether a residual-
clause enhancement was a necessary condition for the Guidelines range and the size of the 
group for which this determination would have to be made. See supra note 13 (explaining 
why it is difficult to figure out how many defendants have viable Johnson claims). 
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whether Johnson’s constitutional holding applies to the Guidelines179 
and (2) whether Johnson is retroactive on collateral review in 
Guidelines cases.180 A defendant’s access to Johnson relief thus 
depends on the circuit or district in which he or she was convicted or is 
incarcerated.181 
After Johnson, the Eleventh Circuit was the first federal court of 
appeals to analyze the constitutional issue.182 In United States v. 
Matchett, the court rejected the government’s concession that Johnson 
invalidated the Guidelines’ residual clause, instead holding the 
prohibition of vagueness in criminal statutes did not apply to the 
Guidelines.183 
First, the court quoted Johnson for the proposition that the 
“vagueness doctrine ‘appl[ies] not only to statutes defining elements of 
crimes, but also to statutes fixing sentences.’”184 The Matchett court 
concluded the Guidelines do not “fix” sentences because they are 
“merely ‘the starting point and the initial benchmark’ designed to 
 
179 See infra, notes 183–219 and accompanying text. 
180 See supra note 177. 
181 For example, some district courts in the Fourth Circuit permitted Johnson challenges 
to the Guidelines, while others barred them. Compare United States v. Cotton, No. 7:15-
CR-21-FL, 2015 WL 4757560, at *9 (E.D.N.C. Aug. 12, 2015) (holding Guidelines immune 
from vagueness challenges) and McRae v. United States, No. 13-3331, 2015 WL 4641167 
at *4 n.1 (D. Md. Aug. 3, 2015), with Lucas v. United States, 162 F. Supp. 3d 883, 887 
(D.S.D. Feb. 10, 2016) (applying Johnson to invalidate Guidelines’ residual clause). The 
defendant in Cotton filed an appeal, which is currently pending before the Fourth Circuit. 
United States v. Cotton, No. 15-4480, 2016 WL 3746407, (M.D. Fla. July 13, 2016). 
182 Many federal courts of appeals have avoided the constitutional question, either by 
accepting the government’s concession and assuming, without deciding, that Johnson 
invalidated the Guidelines’ residual clause or by remanding for the district court to make a 
determination on the constitutional question. See United States v. Torres, — F.3d —, 2016 
WL 3770517, at *9 (9th Cir. July 14, 2016) (“Based on the Government’s concession, we 
assume without deciding that Johnson’s holding nullifies § 4B1.2(a)(2)’s identically worded 
residual clause.”); United States v. Soto-Rivera, 811 F.3d 53, 59 n.8 (1st Cir. Jan. 22, 2016) 
(“Given that the government has explicitly waived any reliance on [the Guidelines’ residual 
clause here, this is not the cause for us to opine on [the constitutionality of that clause.]”); 
United States v. Frazier, 621 F. App’x 166, 168 (4th Cir. Aug. 28, 2015) (assuming without 
deciding that Johnson invalidated the Guidelines’ residual clause); United States v. 
Maldonado, 581 F. App’x 19, 22–23 (2d Cir. 2014) (“Because the parties do not dispute this 
issue, we decline to decide whether the due process concerns that led the Johnson Court to 
rule the ACCA’s residual clause void for vagueness are equally applicable to the Sentencing 
Guidelines.”). 
183 802 F.3d 1185, 1194 (11th Cir. 2015). In part of her excellent essay about open 
questions after Johnson, Leah Litman examines the court’s decision to reject the 
government’s concession in light of traditional notions of waiver and forfeiture. Litman, 
supra note 16. 
184 United States v. Matchett, 802 F.3d 1185, 1194 (2015) (alteration in original) (quoting 
Johnson, 135 S Ct. at 2557). 
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‘assist . . . the sentencing judge’ in determining a sentence.”185 The 
court noted before the Guidelines, judges exercised broad discretion to 
impose a sentence within statutory limits.186 The Guidelines, which 
merely place some mandatory (pre-Booker) or advisory (post-Booker) 
constraints on that discretion, could not trigger due process protection 
because defendants have “no constitutional right . . . to a less 
discretionary application of sentences than that permitted prior to the 
Guidelines.”187 
The court next placed great weight on a 2008 Supreme Court 
decision, United States v. Irizarry.188 Irizarry concerned a defendant’s 
constitutional right to notice and an opportunity to be heard before a 
judge imposed a sentence above the applicable Guidelines range for 
any ground not raised in the presentence report or in a party’s 
prehearing submission.189 Before Booker, a defendant had been 
entitled to such notice pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 
32(h).190 In Irizarry, the Court concluded that a post-Booker “variance” 
(the term for a deviation from the now-advisory Guidelines range) was 
not the same as a pre-Booker “departure” within the meaning of the 
federal rule.191 The Court also held that, assuming there had been a pre-
Booker “expectation subject to due process protection . . . that a 
criminal defendant would receive a sentence within the presumptively 
applicable Guidelines range,”192 that expectation and corresponding 
right to notice did not transfer to the post-Booker advisory system.193 
Because the Guidelines were now advisory, “neither the Government 
nor the defendant may place the same degree of reliance on the type of 
 
185 Id. (quoting Gall v. United States, 552 U.S. 38, 49 (2014) and United States v. 
Tichenor, 683 F.3d 358, 364 (7th Cir. 2012)). 
186 Id. at 1195. 
187 Id. (quoting United States v. Wivell, 893 F.2d 156, 160 (8th Cir. 1990)). 
188 553 U.S. 708, 708 (2008). 
189 Id. at 709. 
190 Id. 
191 Id. at 714 (“‘Departure’ is a term of art under the Guidelines and refers only to non-
Guidelines sentences imposed under the framework set out in the Guidelines.”). 
192 Before Booker, the Supreme Court never actually decided whether such notice was 
constitutionally required. Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 32(h) was promulgated in 
response to the Court’s decision in Burns v. United States, 501 U.S. 129, 129 (1991). In that 
case, the Supreme Court interpreted the previous version of Rule 32 to include a notice 
requirement for departures from the Guidelines range, noting that to read the rule otherwise 
would require the Court “to confront the serious question whether notice in this setting is 
mandated by the Due Process Clause.” Id. at 138. 
193 Irizarry v. United States, 553 U.S. 708, 713–14 (2008). 
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‘expectancy’ that gave rise to a special need for notice” before 
Booker.194 
The Eleventh Circuit interpreted Irizarry to hold that, post-Booker, 
criminal defendants had no due process right to notice of the Guidelines 
that would apply at their sentencing.195 Citing the vagueness doctrine’s 
roots in concerns about fair notice, the Matchett court read Irizarry to 
foreclose the doctrine’s application to the Guidelines.196 Finally, the 
court rejected the defendant’s argument that Peugh meant the Due 
Process Clause applies to the Guidelines.197 The court distinguished 
the ex post facto “sufficient risk of a higher sentence” test from the 
vagueness doctrine’s “fix sentences” test, and stated that “[w]hether the 
Ex Post Facto Clause applies to the advisory guidelines in no way 
informs our analysis.”198 
Other federal appellate courts disagreed. In United States v. Madrid, 
the Tenth Circuit focused on the second concern undergirding the 
vagueness doctrine: that vague statutes produce arbitrary results.199 
The court noted such arbitrariness would be unavoidable in 
adjudicating questions about the applicability of the Guidelines’ 
residual clause to a given crime: “it stretches credulity to say that we 
could apply the residual clause of the Guidelines in a way that is 
constitutional, when courts cannot do so in the context of the 
ACCA.”200 For the Madrid court, the post-Booker advisory nature of 
the Guidelines did not change the analysis, because they remain “the 
beginning of all sentencing determinations.”201 The court 
acknowledged the circuit split on the applicability of the due process 
right to notice of the Guidelines.202 But it noted that the split predated 
Peugh, which affirmed the Guidelines “are subject to constitutional 
challenge ‘notwithstanding the fact that sentencing courts possess 
discretion to deviate from the recommended sentencing range.’”203 
The Sixth Circuit also held the Guidelines may be challenged on 
vagueness grounds.204 United States v. Pawlak held special 
 
194 Id.  
195 United States v. Matchett, 802 F.3d 1185, 1194 (11th Cir. 2015). 
196 Id. 
197 Id. at 1195. 
198 Id. 
199 United States v. Madrid, 805 F.3d 1204, 1210 (10th Cir. 2015). 
200 Id. at 1211. 
201 Id. 
202 Id. at 1211 n.9. 
203 Id. at 1211 (quoting Peugh v. United States, 133 S. Ct. 2072, 2082 (2013)). 
204 United States v. Pawlak, 822 F.3d 902 (6th Cir. 2016). 
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significance because the Sixth Circuit, unlike the Tenth, had 
longstanding precedent barring vagueness attacks on the Guidelines.205 
The Sixth Circuit expressly overruled that precedent as inconsistent 
with Peugh, reasoning that the Supreme Court’s ex post facto holding 
in Peugh “rests on the very same principles of fair notice and avoiding 
arbitrary enforcement underlying” a vagueness challenge to the 
Guidelines.206 The court continued: “Post-Johnson and Peugh, the fact 
that the Guidelines are not mandatory is a distinction without a 
difference. In our view, Johnson’s rationale applies with equal force to 
the Guidelines’ residual clause.”207 
The Third Circuit weighed in next, agreeing with the Sixth and Tenth 
Circuits.208 Like the Tenth Circuit in Madrid, the court in United States 
v. Calabretta focused on the vagueness doctrine’s function as a 
safeguard against arbitrary decision-making.209 The Third Circuit 
relied heavily on its “prior case law” interpreting the Guidelines’ 
“crime of violence” definition identically to the ACCA’s “violent 
felony” definition.210 The court reasoned that “if the ACCA’s residual 
clause invites arbitrary enforcement, so does the residual clause in § 
41B.2.”211 Just two weeks later, the D.C. Circuit endorsed the 
reasoning of the Third, Sixth, and Tenth Circuits in holding that a 
district court’s use of the residual clause in calculating the Guidelines 
range constituted plain error after Johnson.212 Quoting Peugh, the court 
wrote that “[w]here the Guidelines ‘exert controlling influence on the 
sentence that the court will impose,’ an unconstitutionally vague 
Guidelines provision that has the effect of doubling or tripling a 
defendant’s sentence is constitutionally problematic in its own 
right.”213 
Most recently, the Seventh Circuit joined the Third, Sixth, Tenth, 
and D.C. Circuits to hold that the Guidelines can be challenged on 
 
205 Id. (citing United States v. Smith, 73 F.3d 1414, 1417–18 (6th Cir. 1994)); see also 
United States v. Pearson, 910 F.2d 221, 223 (5th Cir. 1990). 
206 Pawlak, 822 F.3d at 906. 
207 Id. 
208 United States v. Calabretta, 831 F.3d 128, 133–34 (3d Cir. 2016). 
209 See id. at 136–37 (concluding that “regardless of whether defendants are entitled to 
‘fair notice’ under an advisory Guidelines system, the due process concerns over arbitrary 
enforcement are implicated here” (footnote omitted)). 
210 Id. at 134. 
211 Id. at 135. 
212 United States v. Sheffield, 832 F.3d 296, 313 (D.C. Cir. 2016). 
213 Id. (quoting Peugh v. United States, 133 S. Ct. 2072, 2085 (2013)). 
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vagueness grounds.214 In United States v. Hurlburt, the court had to 
revisit a 2012 decision, United States v. Tichenor, which had held “that 
the Guidelines, as a matter of law, are not susceptible to vagueness 
challenges.”215 Tichenor concluded the vagueness doctrine did not 
apply to the Guidelines for two reasons: “because [the Guidelines] do 
not declare any conduct illegal” and because Booker “demoted the 
guidelines from rules to advice.”216 The Hurlburt court concluded that 
Johnson—a decision about a sentencing provision that did not declare 
any conduct illegal—“conclusively refutes Tichenor’s first 
premise.”217 And Peugh, which focused on the Guidelines’ enduring 
real-world consequences, “fatally undermined” the second premise.218 
The Seventh Circuit overruled Tichenor and “join[ed] a growing 
consensus among the circuits” that Johnson renders the Guidelines’ 
residual clause unconstitutionally vague.219 
Going forward, Johnson presents two questions relevant to the 
Guidelines, one narrow and one broad. The narrow question is whether 
the Court’s invalidation of the ACCA’s residual clause on vagueness 
grounds necessarily voids a textually identical Guidelines provision. 
The deletion of the residual clause from the Guidelines mooted that 
narrow question going forward.220 Regardless of changes to the 
Guidelines, however, the narrow question remains alive and significant 
for hundreds of defendants serving sentences imposed after their 
Guidelines range was calculated using the residual clause. Moreover, 
whether Johnson invalidates the Guidelines’ residual clause 
necessarily raises a broader question: does the vagueness doctrine 
apply to the advisory Guidelines at all?221 
 
214 United States v. Hurlburt, 835 F.3d 715, 725 (7th Cir. 2016) (en banc). 
215 683 F.3d 358, 367 (7th Cir. 2012). 
216 Hurlburt, 835 F.3d at 721−22. 
217 Id. at 722. 
218 Id. 
219 Id. at 725. 
220 See supra notes 174–76 and accompanying text. 
221 The current state of the circuit split on this question can be characterized as 5–1 or 6–
3, depending on which decisions you count. The “score” is 5–1 in favor of permitting 
vagueness challenges counting only the post-Johnson decisions in Matchett, Madrid, 
Pawlak, Calabretta, Sheffield, and Hurlburt but shifts to a narrower 6–3 in favor of 
vagueness challenges reaching back to bring in the pre-Booker decisions. It is not entirely 
clear which is the “correct” count. On the one hand, it seems reasonable to include the pre-
Booker decisions; it makes little sense to think a court that decided the vagueness doctrine 
did not apply to mandatory Guidelines could determine the vagueness doctrine does apply 
to advisory Guidelines without running afoul of the old precedent. On the other hand, courts 
of appeals with case law in the pre-Booker category do not appear to consider that case law 
controlling. See, e.g., United States v. Lee, 821 F.3d 1124, 1127 (9th Cir. 2016) 
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III 
DUE PROCESS MAKES THE GUIDELINES SUSCEPTIBLE TO VAGUENESS 
CHALLENGES 
The residual clauses of the ACCA and the Guidelines are textually 
identical: both state that a conviction qualifies as a “violent felony” or 
“crime of violence” if it “involves conduct that presents a serious 
potential risk of physical injury to another.”222 Just as the ACCA’s 
residual clause significantly enhanced the applicable statutory 
minimum and maximum sentences, the Guidelines’ residual clause 
dramatically affects the advisory sentencing range. It generally does 
this in two ways: by imposing a mandatory criminal history category 
of VI (the highest criminal history category) and by placing a floor on 
the offense level.223 The effect of these two changes varies from case 
to case, but frequently increases the applicable Guidelines range by up 
to a decade of imprisonment. In 2014, the average guideline minimum 
for a career offender was ten years longer than the minimum for a non-
career offender, and the average sentence actually imposed for career 
offenders was more than six years longer than for non-career 
offenders.224 As the Supreme Court acknowledged in Peugh and 
Molina-Martinez, we know a higher Guidelines range in the aggregate 
exerts tremendous influence on the sentence actually imposed. The 
question, then, is whether the due process analysis is different because 
a judge in any given case is free to depart from the Guidelines range, 




(acknowledging “division among our sister circuits as to whether the residual clause in the 
Guidelines . . . is . . . void for vagueness,” but declining to address the constitutional 
question); United States v. Gonzalez-Longoria, 813 F.3d 225, 228 (5th Cir. 2016) (“We have 
not previously decided [whether guideline provisions are subject to vagueness challenges] 
in a published case, though unpublished cases have agreed with the approach adopted by the 
Eleventh Circuit.”). At the very least, it is clear the circuits are in disagreement. As stated in 
note 2, supra, the Supreme Court has granted certiorari in a case that may resolve the split. 
222 Compare 18 U.S.C. § 924(e)(2)(B) (2012), with U.S SENTENCING GUIDELINES § 
4B1.2(a)(2) (U.S. SENTENCING COMM’N 2015). 
223 See supra note 73; U.S SENTENCING GUIDELINES § 4B1.1(a) (U.S. SENTENCING 
COMM’N 2015). The “career offender” provision is the most common way a residual clause 
determination comes into play. As explained in note 45, supra, however, there are also other 
Guidelines provisions that use the “crime of violence” definition. 
224 PAUL J. HOFER, SENTENCING RES. COUNSEL PROJECT, DATA ANALYSES 1 (2016), 
http://www.src-project.org/wp-content/uplaods/2016/04/Data-Analyses-1.pdf. 
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A. If the Guidelines Can’t Be Challenged on Vagueness Grounds, 
Federal Courts Will Be Forced to Issue Arbitrary Decisions 
It strikes at the heart of the Due Process Clause to suggest the 
inconsistent, arbitrary precedent struck down in Johnson could 
continue to be applied to calculate thousands of Guidelines ranges each 
year without running afoul of due process. As the Tenth Circuit 
explained, a core purpose of the vagueness doctrine is “to prevent 
judges from imposing arbitrary or systematically inconsistent 
sentences. The Supreme Court made this clear when it struck down the 
ACCA’s residual clause because of the ‘unavoidable uncertainty and 
arbitrariness of the adjudication’ that it created.”225 
Johnson brings this point into sharp relief. The Supreme Court 
minced no words when it held that the ACCA’s residual clause could 
not be interpreted consistently; despite the Court’s best efforts, it 
inexorably resulted in unfairness to defendants.226 It follows that any 
court opinions applying the textually identical Guidelines’ residual 
clause will necessarily be arbitrary. After Johnson, the Commission 
acted to eliminate the Guidelines’ residual clause going forward.227 But 
that action was entirely voluntary; there is no guarantee the 
Commission would take such action in the future.228 In fact, the 
Commission would be free to resurrect the residual clause if it chose to 
do so. Furthermore, Johnson is a reminder that there may well be 
provisions in application now that pose serious vagueness concerns. 
Defendants must have an avenue to challenge those provisions if they 
prove impossible to interpret or enforce with consistency.229 
The arbitrariness issue is underscored by the following thought 
experiment: how would a federal court decide whether a conviction 
 
225 United States. v. Madrid, 805 F.3d 1204, 1210 (2015) (quoting Johnson v. United 
States, 135 S. Ct. 2551, 2562 (2015)). 
226 See Johnson, 135 S. Ct. at 2562 (stating the Court’s previous “repeated attempts and 
repeated failures to craft a principled and objective standard out of the residual clause 
confirm its hopeless indeterminacy”). 
227 Notably, the Commission did not acknowledge any constitutional deficiency; it 
appears to have acted on grounds of fairness and pragmatism. Moreover, the Commission 
has not made the change to Guidelines retroactive, even though it has the power to do so. 
See supra note 178. Accordingly, although the amendment eliminates this particular 
vagueness problem going forward, it does nothing to address the concerns of defendants 
already sentenced with a residual-clause Guidelines enhancement. As discussed in note 13, 
supra, that group likely is quite large. 
228 See Baron-Evans & Stith, supra note 128, at 1643–45 (detailing the Commission’s 
insulation from judicial review and political accountability). 
229 See Derrick Moore, Note, “Crimes Involving Moral Turpitude”: Why the Void-for 
Vagueness Argument is Still Available and Meritorious, 41 CORNELL INT’L L.J. 813 (2008). 
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qualifies as a residual-clause “crime of violence” after Johnson? Recall 
that federal appellate courts applied the same precedent to cases 
involving the ACCA’s and Guidelines’ residual clauses. Didn’t 
Johnson necessarily invalidate that entire line of precedent? In the 
wake of Johnson, what process could a federal court follow to 
determine if a prior conviction is for a “crime of violence” within the 
meaning of the residual clause? 
The Ninth Circuit’s recent decision in United States v. Lee highlights 
this problem. In that case, the majority sidestepped deciding whether 
Johnson invalidated the Guidelines’ residual clause by determining that 
the district court’s “career offender” determination was erroneous even 
under pre-Johnson case law.230 In dissent, Judge Ikuta criticized the 
majority for avoiding the hard constitutional question by improperly 
applying “precedent that has been overruled and effectively rendered 
non-existent by the Supreme Court.”231 Judge Ikuta went on to explain 
that she would hold the Guidelines are immune from vagueness 
challenges.232 Nonetheless, she argued that Johnson doomed the 
Guidelines’ residual clause on other grounds. Specifically, she 
reasoned that “given the residual clause’s inscrutability in the ACCA 
context, application of the residual clause would violate the Supreme 
Court’s instruction that the district court ‘begin all sentencing 
proceedings by correctly calculating the applicable Guidelines 
range.’”233 As a result, any court using the residual clause to calculate 
the Guidelines range would commit procedural error because such an 
arbitrary calculation would not be “correct.”234 
The path of Judge Ikuta’s reasoning nicely illustrates the post-
Johnson pitfalls of attempting to interpret the residual clause. First, 
there is the problem of following precedent declared dead by the 
Supreme Court because that precedent was arbitrary. Second, there is 
the problem of making a legal determination the Supreme Court has 
clearly stated can only be made in an arbitrary fashion. Judge Ikuta 
attempts to distance these problems from the Due Process Clause, and 
she is correct the problems are not only about arbitrariness—they also 
arise because the Supreme Court instructs lower courts to follow its 
precedent (which includes abandoning precedent the Court overrules) 
and correctly calculate the Guidelines range. But these issues are 
 
230 United States v. Lee, 821 F.3d 1124, 1127 (2016). 
231 Id. at 1136 (Ikuta, J., dissenting). 
232 Id. at 1135. 
233 Id. at 1133 (quoting Gall v. United States, 552 U.S. 38, 49 (2007)). 
234 Id. at 1136. 
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inextricably bound up in the Due Process Clause. Due process does not 
countenance judicial application and enforcement of arbitrary rules. A 
court applying pre-Johnson residual clause case law necessarily runs 
afoul of this principle. Judge Ikuta’s non-constitutional “fix” does not 
solve this problem. It is true that a court holding a defendant’s prior 
conviction was for a crime of violence under the residual clause would 
violate the Supreme Court’s directive to correctly calculate the 
Guidelines range. But a court refusing to determine whether a prior 
conviction qualified as a residual-clause crime of violence also would 
run afoul of that directive, because it would be ignoring part of the 
formula for calculating that range. As long as the residual clause is a 
part of the formula for calculating the Guidelines range, a court could 
never “correctly” calculate the applicable range for any defendant with 
a prior conviction that might qualify under the residual clause, because 
ignoring the clause as if it didn’t exist does not yield a “correct” answer 
either. The only remedy is to strike the vague language. 
Some courts have pushed back against concerns about arbitrariness 
in the Guidelines context, arguing such concerns do not implicate the 
Due Process Clause because sentencing is an arena uniquely defined 
by judicial discretion. In Matchett, the Eleventh Circuit cautioned that 
opening up the Guidelines to vagueness challenges would “upend” the 
sentencing regime because “many [Guidelines] provisions could be 
described as vague.”235 The court identified two such provisions: the 
offense level enhancement if the crime “involved sophisticated means” 
and the offense level decrease triggered by a role as a “minor 
participant.”236 Because judges might vary in their application of these 
provisions, the court reasoned, “[h]olding that advisory guidelines can 
be unconstitutionally vague would invite more, not less, instability.”237 
Decades earlier, the Eighth Circuit in Wivell raised a similar concern: 
Because there is no constitutional right to sentencing guidelines—or, 
more generally, to a less discretionary application of sentences than 
that permitted prior to the Guidelines—the limitations the Guidelines 
place on a judge’s discretion cannot violate a defendant’s right to due 
process by reason of being vague . . . . Even vague guidelines cabin 
discretion more than no guidelines at all. What a defendant may call 
arbitrary and capricious, the legislature may call discretionary, and 
 
235 United States v. Matchett, 802 F.3d 1185, 1195–96 (11th Cir. 2015). 
236 Id. (quoting U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES §§ 2B1.1(b)(10) & 3B1.2(b) (U.S. 
SENTENCING COMM’N 2015). 
237 Id. 
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the Constitution permits legislatures to lodge a considerable amount 
of discretion with judges in devising sentences.238 
This reasoning is unpersuasive for two reasons. First, it ignores the 
fact that, as demonstrated by the statistics about the relationship 
between Guidelines ranges and sentences actually imposed, Guidelines 
that change the offense level or criminal history category are 
qualitatively different than traditional sentencing considerations that 
may influence a judge’s discretion in an amorphous manner. There is a 
principled way to draw a line between challenges to Guidelines 
provisions and challenges to exercises of discretion in sentencing. 
Indeed, the Supreme Court has drawn such a line many times. In 
Booker, the Court saw no Sixth Amendment problem with a judge 
exercising “discretion to select a specific sentence within a defined 
range.”239 Nonetheless, it found mandatory application of the 
Guidelines violated the right to trial by jury because the Guidelines had 
“the force and effect of laws.”240 Similarly, in Johnson, the Court took 
the time to note that its holding the ACCA’s residual clause was 
unconstitutionally vague did not cause it to question “the 
constitutionality of laws that call for the application of a qualitative 
standard such as ‘substantial risk’ to real-world conduct; ‘the law is full 
of instances where a man’s fate depends on his estimating rightly . . . 
some matter of degree.’”241 
Second, the “instability” the Matchett court referred to appears to be 
litigation challenging the application of these provisions. But, while the 
Due Process Clause protects against the instability of arbitrary 
decision-making, it provides no protection for courts against the 
“instability” of litigation. In any event, any concern that permitting 
vagueness challenges to the Guidelines will lead to a flood of litigation 
striking down Guidelines provisions left and right is overblown. Any 
statute affecting deprivations of life, liberty, or property may be 
challenged on vagueness grounds now, yet it is quite rare for one of 
those challenges to succeed. This is best underscored by the Ninth 
Circuit and other courts who for decades have addressed vagueness 
challenges to the Guidelines on their merits without opening the door 
to the parade of horribles feared by the Matchett court. 
 
238 United States v. Wivell, 893 F.2d 156, 160 (8th Cir. 1990) (emphasis added). 
239 Booker v. United States, 543 U.S. 220, 233 (2005). 
240 Id. at 234. 
241 Johnson v. United States, 135 S. Ct. 2551, 2561 (2015) (quoting Nash v. United 
States, 229 U.S. 373, 377 (1913)). 
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As Johnson demonstrates, immunizing the Guidelines from 
vagueness challenges would sometimes leave courts with no choice but 
to issue arbitrary decisions. That result is incompatible with the Due 
Process Clause. The Supreme Court has declared the text of the residual 
clause hopelessly indeterminate; applying basic due process safeguards 
against arbitrariness, the clause must go. 
B. Advisory Guidelines Implicate Valid Notice Interests 
The other concern underlying the vagueness doctrine is fair 
notice.242 Part of the process that is due an individual is notice of what 
the law requires, including the length of the sentence. There is often a 
wide gulf between the statutory minimum and maximum sentences for 
a crime. Empirical evidence establishes the Guidelines as the most 
significant factor in influencing how sentencing judges will navigate 
that gulf. The legal manifestation of this practical reality is that 
defendants have a constitutional right to notice of the Guidelines that 
will apply in a given case. A vague Guideline deprives them of that 
notice. 
The Eleventh Circuit in Matchett disputed the notion that defendants 
have a due process right to notice of the Guidelines that will apply in a 
given case, holding there is “no constitutional right . . . to a less 
discretionary application of sentences than that permitted prior to the 
Guidelines.”243 This ignores the fact that an individual might react 
quite differently to very broad unfettered discretion (for example, a 
three-to-twelve-year statutory range with no advisory guidelines) than 
to a narrowing guideline range making it significantly more likely the 
sentence will fall in a particular segment of the statutory range (say, 
advisory ranges of three to five years versus ten to twelve years.) In 
other words, a rational actor contemplating committing a crime would 
feel differently about a likely four-year sentence with the possibility of 
an eleven-year-sentence than he or she would about a likely eleven-
year sentence with the possibility of a four-year sentence.244 
 
242 Hill v. Colorado, 530 U.S. 703, 732 (2000). 
243 United States v. Matchett, 802 F.3d 1185, 1195 (11th Cir. 2015). 
244 The idea that a potential offender may choose not to commit a crime because of the 
harshness of the punishment for that crime is known as general deterrence. Erik Luna, 
Spoiled Rotten Social Background, 2 ALA. C.R. & C.L. L. REV. 23, 34 (2011) (“[T]he goal 
of general deterrence . . . suggests that punishing a given offender can serve as an example 
for other potential wrongdoers, tipping their cost-benefit analysis against committing 
crime.”). The government has argued for above-Guidelines sentences based on the need for 
general deterrence, arguing credit card skimmers, as “rational actors,” would be responsive 
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Since 2008, the courts that have held the Guidelines cannot be 
challenged on vagueness grounds have grounded their decisions in part 
on Irizarry’s statement that a defendant has no “expectation subject to 
due process protection that [he or she] w[ill] receive a sentence within 
the presumptively applicable Guidelines range.”245 But Irizarry did not 
hold that defendants had no notice rights attached to the Guidelines 
generally, much less declare the Guidelines’ independence from the 
Due Process Clause. It held that, post-Booker, criminal defendants have 
constitutionally adequate notice that a sentencing judge may impose a 
sentence that is outside the Guidelines range.246 The decision said 
nothing about a defendant’s broader notice right to know what that 
range is in a given case, and it did not touch on any due process 
concerns beyond notice. 
Moreover, Irizarry addressed a different type of notice than the type 
implicated by vagueness challenges to the Guidelines. As Carissa 
Byrne Hessick and F. Andrew Hessick explain, due process 
encompasses two types of notice: “ex ante” notice, which includes the 
requirement that the “law must give notice to the public of what 
conduct is prohibited and the consequences for performing that 
conduct,” and adversarial notice, which in the sentencing context is 
about giving defendants notice of the reasons on which the court will 
base its sentencing determination.247 Knowing which Guidelines apply 
to a particular crime and defendant is ex ante notice, while knowing the 
judge is contemplating a departure from the advisory range reached 
pursuant to those Guidelines is adversarial notice.248 Thus, Irizarry’s 
determination that due process does not mandate a particular type of 
adversarial notice says nothing about what type of ex ante notice is 
required.249 
Peugh supports this narrow reading of Irizarry. The Peugh majority 
rejected the argument that Irizarry barred a constitutional challenge to 
the Guidelines, noting that “the Ex Post Facto Clause does not merely 
protect reliance interests. It also reflects principles of ‘fundamental 
 
to enhanced penalties for fraud. See United States v. Edmondson, 394 F. App’x 511, 515 
(11th Cir. 2009). 
245 Irizarry v. United States, 553 U.S. 708, 713 (2008); see also Matchett, 802 F.3d at 
1194; United States v. Tichenor, 683 F.3d 358, 364 (7th Cir. 2012). 
246 Irizarry, 553 U.S. at 715. 
247 See Carissa Byrne Hessick & F. Andrew Hessick, Procedural Rights at Sentencing, 
90 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 187, 210 (2014). 
248 See id. at 212 (explaining Irizarry in these terms). 
249 See United States v. Pawlak, 822 F.3d 902, 909 (6th Cir. 2016). 
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justice.’”250 At first glance, this statement might be read to suggest that 
Irizarry barred a due process challenge to the Guidelines but left open 
other constitutional challenges. But procedural due process is not only 
about notice. As the Supreme Court has acknowledged, it is 
“undoubtedly correct” to say that the Due Process and Ex Post Facto 
Clauses “safeguard” certain “common interests,” including “the 
prevention of the arbitrary and vindictive use of the laws.”251 Because 
the Supreme Court has so clearly stated that the Ex Post Facto and Due 
Process Clauses guard against arbitrariness, the statement in Peugh 
about “merely protect[ing] reliance interests” must be read to narrow 
the scope of Irizarry, not to limit the reach of the Due Process 
Clause.252 The best reading of Irizarry—and of Peugh’s interpretation 
of Irizarry—is as a narrow decision that defendants are not 
constitutionally entitled to a particular form of adversarial notice in a 
very specific context. 
Finally, an examination of defendants’ due process rights in the 
supervised release253 context reveals the practical value of vagueness 
challenges with respect to fair notice. For example, the Second Circuit 
considered a challenge to a requirement that the defendant inform the 
probation office if he entered into a “significant romantic 
relationship.”254 The court held this condition violated the Due Process 
Clause because “people of common intelligence . . . would find it 
impossible to agree on the proper application” of the term “significant 
romantic relationship.”255 In another case, the Ninth Circuit invalidated 
on vagueness grounds a condition prohibiting the defendant from 
“access[ing] via computer any material that relates to pornography of 
any kind.”256 
If the Guidelines cannot be challenged on vagueness grounds, the 
Commission would be free to promulgate provisions that do not put 
 
250 Peugh v. United States, 133 S. Ct. 2072, 2085 (2013). 
251 Rogers v. Tennessee, 532 U.S. 451, 460 (2001); see also Miller v. Florida, 482 U.S. 
423, 429 (1987) (identifying both lack of notice and the arbitrary or vindictive decision 
making as concerns underlying the Ex Post Facto Clause). 
252 Peugh, 133 S. Ct. at 2085. 
253 “Supervised release came into existence as part of Congress’s 1984 sentencing reform 
. . . . During a term of supervised release, the defendant is not incarcerated but is subject to 
restrictions on his liberty. The Second Circuit has characterized supervised release as ‘the 
reformed successor to federal parole.’” 3 FED. PRAC. & PROC. CRIM. § 584 (4th ed.) (quoting 
United States v. Reyes, 283 F.3d 446, 458 (2d Cir. 2002)). 
254 United States v. Reeves, 591 F.3d 77, 80 (2d Cir. 2010). 
255 Id. at 81. 
256 United States v. Stoterau, 524 F.3d 988, 1002 (9th Cir. 2008). 
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defendants on notice that they may apply—for example, by increasing 
the offense level (and the corresponding Guidelines range) for online 
harassment “relat[ing] to pornography of any kind”257 or committed 
against the defendant’s partner in a “significant romantic 
relationship.”258 The Commission could even authorize a judge to 
increase the Guidelines range if the defendant committed a crime in a 
“sexually inappropriate” manner—a classic example of the sort of 
expansive term that triggers fair notice concerns. Guideline provisions 
reliably change the duration of deprivation of liberty, and a rational 
actor might make a different decision depending on which Guideline 
provisions will apply in a particular case. Accordingly, the Guidelines 
raise notice concerns under the Due Process Clause. 
CONCLUSION 
The vagueness doctrine serves two purposes: it ensures laws 
affecting criminal liability and punishment are specific enough to put 
defendants on fair notice of the consequences of their actions, and it 
protects against arbitrary enforcement of those laws. Holding the 
Guidelines immune from vagueness challenges runs afoul of both 
principles, with devastating consequences. The applicability of the 
Guidelines’ residual clause in a given case often alters the 
recommended sentencing range by years, if not a decade or more. 
The questions raised by Johnson reach far beyond the now-defunct 
Guidelines’ residual clause. The vagueness doctrine is an important 
safeguard against arbitrary deprivations of liberty without adequate 
process. Roughly 75,000 individuals are sentenced each year in the 
federal system.259 For each of them, the Guidelines are the mandatory 
starting point, the most likely ending point, and a powerful 
gravitational force. Immunizing the Guidelines from vagueness 
challenges deprives these individuals both of notice of the likely 
consequences of their actions and of any meaningful way to challenge 
arbitrary enforcement of the Guidelines. The Due Process Clause 




258 Reeves, 591 F.3d at 80. 
259 See 2014 COMM’N REPORT, supra note 1, at A-5. 
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